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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROLE
OF ARBITRATION UNDER TITLE VII
Harry T. Edwards* and Joel H. Kaplan**
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government ..• but it gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit
of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities. . . • We must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary
in communal life; and we can hope for no reward for the sacrifices
this may require beyond our satisfactions from within, or our
expectations of a better world.
-Judge Learned Hand1

of the major thrusts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 passed
by the 88th Congress of the United States after much procrastination and debate, 3 is title VII,4 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, which prohibits selected forms of employment discrimination.
In drafting title VII, the proponents of the Act were chiefly concerned with racial discrimination in employment.5 In fact, the entire
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1. Otten v. Baltimore&: O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975-75e, 2000a to h-6 (1964), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975c, 1975e, 2000d-l, 2000d-5, 2000e, 2000e-14, 2000g (Supp.
v, 1965-1969).
3. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, THE CIVIL RIGHTS Ac:r OF 1964, at 17-22 (1964) [here•
inafter OPERATIONS MANUAL].
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -15 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-14 (Supp.
v, 1965-1969).
5. This emphasis is evident from the language of the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which states:
In varying regions of the Country there is discrimination against some minority
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipa•
tion, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, are by virtue of
one or another type of d1Scrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and
opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens.••• No Bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities.
It is, however, possible and necessary for Congress to enact legislation which
prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimination. This H.R. 7159., as amended, would achieve in a number of related
areas. • • • It would prohibit discrimination in employment • • • •
H.R. 7152, as amended, is a constitutional and desirable means of dealing with
the injustices and humiliations of racial and other discrimination . • • •
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess 18 (1963) (emphasis added). The committee's
additional report states:
The bill is a comprehensive measure, but it cannot nor should we expect it
to be a panacea for all our ills. It will not end racial turmoil. No legislation
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Civil Rights Act was written with an eye toward the elimination of
the "glaring ... discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our nation." 6 Given this intent, it is not surprising that, during
the hearings and debates preceding the passage of the Act, Congress
focused its attention primarily on the race discrimination problem.
The legislative history is replete with pronouncements, from friend
and foe alike, concerning the impact of the proposed Act on existing
patterns of racial prejudice in the United States.7
Despite this professed primary concern with racial discrimination,
the legislative authors of title VII intended the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act to be an updated version of what was known in legislative parlance as a "fair employment practices" act. 8 Historically,
fair employment practices (FEP) legislation in the United States has
typically declared unlawful those forms of employment discrimination that are based on an individual's race, color, religion, or national
origin. 9 True to this tradition, Congress, without bothering seriously
to consider or to document the problem, included religious discrimination as one of the employment practices proscribed by title VII.10
could do this. Nor can legislation relax all the tensions of our troubled times
or wipe clean the blot of racial discrimination from our national conscience.
But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the elimination of many of
the worst manifestations of racial prejudice.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1963) (emphasis added). This additional report goes on to discuss title VII, and after citing evidence on the effects of racial
discrimination in employment, the report concludes: "More positive and enduring steps
must be taken, therefore, to cure this evil and before racial unrest eats irretrievably
into the body of the American industrial system. In response to this need, the Judiciary
Committee incorporated Title VII into H.R. 7152." Id. at 29.
6. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963).
7. For example, in his message to the Congress dated Feb. 23, 1963, President
Kennedy urged upon the Congress the need for a broad civil-rights enactment:
The various steps which have been undertaken or which are proposed in this mes•
sage do not constitute a final answer to the problems of race discrimination in
this country. • • • Other measures directed toward these same goals will be
favorably commented on and supported, as they have in the past-and they will
be signed if enacted into law.
109 CoNG. REc. 3245, 3249 (1963). In this same connection, Representative Celler, who
was both chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary and also the chairman of Subcommittee No. 5, which had conducted the hearings on H.R. 7152, commented that: "Perhaps what we are really talking about is the life of a human being
in the United States, whether a human being because of the color of his skin is being
deprived ••• of his right to equal opportunity to earn a living ••••" 110 CONG. REc.
1517 (1964).
8. OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 3, at 18-20.
9. See, e.g., California Fair Employment Practice Act, CAL. l.ABoR CODE §§ 1410·13
(West 1959); Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 851-66
(1961); Michigan State Fair Employment Practices Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 423.301-.311 (1967); Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 4112.01-99 (Page 1969).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•2 (1964). That serious documentation of religious•discrim•
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In section 703 of the Act, model FEP language is used, making it an
"unlawful employment practice" for "an employer," "a labor organiination problems was wanting in the Judiciary Committee considerations and in the
subcommittee hearings is evidenced by the following portions of the House debates
on the bill:
MR. ABERNATHY [of Mississippi]. I notice in examining the various titles of the
bill that an attempt is made to eliminate several alleged and various kinds of
discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin. Did the
gentleman's committee hear any testimony on any discrimination practiced against
any people of this country because of their religion?
MR. CELLER rof New York who was Judiciary Committee chairman and also
chairman of Subcommittee No. 5, which conducted the hearings on H.R. 7152].
We had testimony concerning religion. We did not have very much testimony of
discriminations on the grounds of religion. You will notice in one of the titles,
religion is left out.
MR. ABERNATHY•••• Who were the people who were being discrimillllted
against because of religion, of what religious faith?
MR. CELLER. We had very little evidence-I do not think we had any of it
insofar as the Committee on the Judiciary is concerned that any particular sect
or religion had been discriminated against.
MR. ABERNATHY. Going to Title VI, the gentleman made mention of the fact
that the word "religion" was removed from Title VI. Can the gentleman tell us
why it is that the bill attem_Pts only to eliminate the kind of discrimination referred to in Title VI, discrimination with regard to race, color, or national origin
only, but specifically omits discrimination as to religion?
MR. RODINO [of New Jersey and member of Subcommittee No. 5 as well as the
House Committee on the Judiciary]. Mr. Chairman, there is a specific reason why
religion was left out of Title VI. There was no evidence that there was a need to
include religion on the question of discrimination.
Various members of the clergy of the different faiths appeared before the
committee and testified that religious discrimination was not a question. We
attempted to meet the problems as they arose. As a result, we did not include
religion.
MR: RODINO •••• I quote from the testimony by Father Cronin, as shown on
page 2030 of the hearings. Father Cronin stated:
I don't believe that need is very pressing at this time. There are remnants of
religious discrimination in the United States, but compared to the instant
problem before us, of the civil rights of the Negro Community, these are very,
very minor and peripheral and I would not have any feeling that this should
be broadened; no.
MR'. .ABERNATHY. I should like to go back to the first question I propounded.
The gentleman, in answer to my question stated that the committee did take
testimony that there was discrimination in this country involving religions but
that no spedfic religion was referred to. If the gentleman is unable to point to
the page of the bearings specifying which religious faith was discriminated against,
I hope that at least, in revising his remarks, he will insert in the RECORD the
faith or faiths he has referred to. Will the gentleman do that?
MR. CELLER. I shall.

MR: ROOSEVELT [of California]. ••• I say to my distinguished friend who just

propounded the question, that information is in the RECORD of the hearings
of the Committee on Education and Labor. There is specific reference to discrimination because of religion. I will insert it in the RECORD in order that the
gentlemen may refer to it.
110 CoNG, R.Ec. 1528-29 (1964) (emphasis added).
Thus, in the open debates of the Committee of the Whole House for consideration
of H.R. 7152, it was brought out that the Committee on the Judiciary received very
little, if any, evidence of religious discrimination. The testimony of Father Cronin
and other clerics at the Judiciary subcommittee hearings on H.R. 7152 was specifically
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zation," or "an employment agency" to "discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex
or national origin."11
Despite the scant legislative consideration, the addition of religious discrimination as an unlawful employment practice under title
VII is not really surprising. The inclusion merely reflects a recognition that the exercise of religious freedom in the United States has
always been considered a fundamental right that lies at the heart of
a free society.12 While this nation was founded on the premise of
directed at the problem of race relations, and most of the testimony on religious dis•
crimination indicated that the latter problem was slight and diminishing. See Hearings
on H.R. 7152 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, pt. 2, at 1152-59, 1363-67, 1987-2051, 2465-75 (1963). Representative
Roosevelt's references (110 CONG. REc. 1529 (1964)) to the earlier hearings before the
Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
offer little amplification of the problem of religious discrimination in employment.
The most telling testimony given to this latter subcommittee was offered by Joseph
Levin, president of the Bureau of Jewish Employment Problems. See Hearings on
Equal Employment opportunity Before the special Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21-32 (1961). Levin gave
evidence to show that some employment agencies were receiving and filling employers'
discriminatory job orders. Id. at 22. Typical of the restrictive specifications on the
job orders were statements such as "This is a gentile firm," "We want Christian
girls," "Protestant only-no Catholics, Jews, or Orientals." Id. Although Levin admit•
ted that some of his statistics were outdated (id. at 30), that his sample source was
very limited (id. at 32), and that the problem had improved in recent years (id. at
30-31), his testimony nevertheless serves to give some documentation to the problem
of religious discrimination at the hiring stage of employment. But Levin and the
other persons who testified before the Special Subcommittee on Labor were uniformly
convinced that racial, not religious, discrimination should be the primary concern of
the proposed federal legislation. See the statement of Joseph Levin (id. at 21, 27); the
statement of Will Maslow, general counsel of American Jewish Congress (id. at 568,
573); and the statement of Moses K. Kove, chairman of New York Anti-Defamation
League (id. at 581). With the exception of Levin, all of the witnesses referred to by
Representative Roosevelt, who appeared before the House Committee on Education
and Labor, dealt primarily with hiring practices that discriminated against Jews. Id.
at 568-95. AB a matter of fact, it is not clear that these witnesses really viewed the dis·
crimination against Jews as an example of "religious discrimination." Mr. Kove, when
asked what type of federal legislation should be enacted to deal with the problem he
had described-i.e., discrimination against Jews-replied: "I think specifically you
ought to have a fair employment practice statute ••• which would make it unlawful
••• to have any practice of discrimination against anyone on the basis of his race, his
creed, his ethnic, his origin, and if you will, his age." Id. at 591 (emphasis added). It
is interesting that Mr. Kove would proscribe "ethnic," but not "religious," discrimina•
tion. It is also interesting that the witnesses appearing before the Education and Labor
Committee dealt only with the easy cases of alleged religious discrimination-i.e.,
willful discriminatory hiring and promotion practices-and then mostly with respect
to discrimination against Jews. No testimony was given concerning the less well-known
religions such as Seventh Day Adventism, and the discussion of religious discrimination was not broadened to include problems such as work assignments that conflict with
religious holidays.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
12. See generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTlTUTION (1964); Antieau,
Religious Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 22 NOTRE DAME LAw. 271 (1947);
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religious freedom, 13 it has long struggled with the legal difficulties
inherent in such freedom.H Indeed, it has been noted that "there are
few issues so likely to generate heat rather than light as the question
of the proper line between the realm of the state and that of the
church."15 In the struggle to define free exercise of religion, a richly
diverse cast of characters (and religions)-including an unemployed
South Carolina woman; 16 a kosher butcher from Massachusetts;17
school children from West Virginia,18 New York,19 and New Jersey; 20
a Staten Island landowner; 21 a Utah bigamist; 22 and a minor public
official from Maryland,23 to name but a few-have played central
roles in the judicially directed effort to find the parameters of reli•
gious freedom in this country.
The first and fourteenth amendments protect the individual's
religious freedom against infringement only by governmental, not
private, action. 24 Therefore, the reference to religious discrimination
in title VII plainly was not intended to be a restatement of the sub.
stantive constitutional right; rather, the Civil Rights Act is grounded
in Congress' regulatory power under the commerce clause of the
Constitution.25 Nevertheless, in the tradition of "heat rather than
Boudin, Freedom of Thought and Religious Liberty Under the Constitution, 4
LA.w. GUILD REv. No 3, at 9 (1944): Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and
Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); Clark, Guidelines for the Free
Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327 (1969); Deutsch, Concept of Freedom of Religion
in American Public Law, 44 B.U. L. REv. 287 (1964): Galanter, Religious Freedoms in
the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIS. L REv. 217; Lake, Freedom To Worship
Curiously, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 203 (1948); Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968); Summers, Sources and Limits of
Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REv. 53 (1946).
13. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. amend. I: M. KoNVlTZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A
FREE PEOPLE 6 (1957) [hereinafter KoNVITZ]; C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE R.EPUBUC
36-59 (1953).
14. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962): Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952): West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. P. KURLAND, OF CHuRCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1961).
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
18. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
20. Everson v • .Board of Educ., 380 U.S. 1 (1947).
21. Walz v. Tax Commr., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
23. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
24. Otten v. Baltimore&: O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953).
25. 110 CoNG. R.Ec. 1528 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8,
provides in part that "the Congress shall have Power ••• to regulate Commerce with
Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
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light," the prohibition against religious discrimination under title
VII is no less troublesome, in definition or application, than the
substantive constitutional right of freedom of religion and the cases
that have heretofore arisen under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company26 is a recent case that amply
demonstrates the confusion that has arisen concerning the scope of
title VII's proscription of religious discrimination. The legal wranglings in Dewey provide an excellent base point for an analysis of the
problems underlying this proscription.

I.

THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE: DEWEY V.

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY

Dewey is a case bristling with analytic difficulty, and it demonstrates why bewilderment, rather than enlightenment, is usually the
end product of a statutory effort to protect the free exercise of
religion in a secular society. More specifically, Dewey attempts to
resolve the potentially serious tensions between an individual's
asserted title VII rights and the rights and obligations that arise
under a collective bargaining contract.
Dewey, an employee of Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds or
Company), had commenced his employment at the Company's Grand
Rapids, Michigan, plant in 1951. He worked there continuously
until September 1966, when he was discharged for his refusal to
perform compulsory overtime work on Sundays or to find a qualified
replacement to do so. At the time of his discharge, Dewey claimed
that, as a member of the Faith Reformed Church since 1961,27 his
religious beliefs prevented him from working on Sundays and also
from having someone work in his place.
While employed at the Reynolds Grand Rapids plant, Dewey
was a member of the production and maintenance bargaining unit
represented by Local 277 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW or Union). In
1966, the collective bargaining agreement then in existence between
the UAW and Reynolds provided that "all employees shall be obligated to perform all straight time and overtime work required of
26. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), reud., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.), rehearing
denied, 429 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971)
(No. 835). See also Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969).
27. It is curious to note that, prior to 1961, Dewey worked Sunday overtime without protest. Reynolds Metals Co., at 4 CTune 29, 1967) (unpub. arbittation award) (Kahn,
Al'bitrator) [hereinafter Kahn].
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them by the Company except when an employee has a substantial and
justifiable reason for not working."28 This provision had been in
force since March 15, 1960. On September 20, 1965, apparently after
the Union had expressed some concern about the enforcement of
the compulsory overtime requirement, the Company adopted a new
procedure that relieved an employee of his obligation to work overtime if he could obtain "a qualified replacement to perform the
scheduled overtime."29
Dewey first ran afoul of the compulsory overtime provision in
November 1965 when he refused to work on a Sunday, basing his
refusal on his religious beliefs. Pursuant to the Company's plant
rules, he received a verbal warning and was advised that a repetition
could lead to more serious disciplinary action. Between January and
August 14, 1966, whenever Dewey was scheduled for Sunday overtime,
he was replaced by another qualified employee, one Jake Zagman.30
However, when Dewey was scheduled for more Sunday work later in
August and in September 1966, he told Zagman not to serve again- as
his replacement. Since, on these later occasions, Dewey did not have a
"qualified replacement" to perform his scheduled Sunday work and
since he refused to work himself, he was disciplined by the Company
for each refusal. Finally, after the third such refusal, Dewey was
discharged in September 1966.
Aggrieved by the discharge, Dewey initiated proceedings on a
broad legal front to obtain vindication. First, pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure, he filed a grievance protesting his
discharge,31 which culminated in arbitration before Arbitrator Mark
L. Kahn. 32 In his award, dated June 29, 1967, Kahn denied the
grievance.33 In doing so, he relied in part on a 1965 arbitration award
at the same plant denying a similar grievance34 and on the withdrawal
28. Kahn, supra note 27, at 2.
29. Kahn, supra note 27, at 2.
30. It is uncertain from the statement of the facts in both the arbitration award
and the various court decisions whether Zagman replaced Dewey at Zagman's or
Dewey's initiative.
31. Dewey':; grievance was presented with that of another employee, Hilbert Scholten, who also refused to work Sunday overtime because of his religious beliefs.
Scholten's three-day disciplinary suspension, like Dewey's discharge, was upheld.
32. Kahn, a well-known and respected arbitrator, is not unmindful of individual
employee rights. See, e.g., Kahn, Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 Toro. &: LAB.
REL. REv. 361 (1955).
33. Kahn, supra note 27.
M. The 1965 award upheld a warning notice to an employee who refused to work
on Sunday because of his religious beliefs. Reynolds Metals Co. Oune 3, 1965) (unpub.
arbitration award) (Haughton, Arbitrator).
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of another such grievance by the Union in 1966.35 Arbitrator Kahn,
in sustaining the Company's position, rendered two basic holdings:
first, that the "substantial and justifiable reason" exception to the
agreement, while justifying an occasional refusal to work overtime
based on one's religious convictions, could not be used as a basis to
refuse all Sunday work; 36 and, second, that Dewey had an obligation
under the contract "to utilize the established replacement procedure
in order to minimize or perhaps avoid entirely the need to confront
the Company with a refusal of Sunday work."37
Contemporaneously with the filing of his contract grievance,
Dewey turned to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission,38 which in
December, 1966 refused to issue a complaint of religious discrimination against Reynolds. The commission ruled:
The findings indicate that the claimant despite due notice of
overtime requirements by the company and the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement provisions, continued to refuse to
perform scheduled overtime work on Sundays and took the position that his right to continued employment while following his
religious belief without interference was an absolute right.
The Commission has previously ruled that where the normal
work week and foreseeable overtime requirements are prescribed in
a Collective Bargaining Agreement, that absent [an] intent on the
part of respondent to discriminate on religious grounds, an employee
is not entitled to demand any alteration in such requirement to
accommodate his religious beliefs.
The investigation did not reveal any intent on the part of the
respondent to discriminate on religious grounds and it is, therefore,
recommended that this application for the issuance of a complaint
be denied for lack of probable cause.39
35. Whether the grievant or the union withdrew the grievance is unknown, but
for purposes of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964), it makes no difference, unless the union's withdrawal constituted a breach of
its duty to fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). For title VII purposes,
however, the difference is arguably important. See pt. V. infra.
36. Kahn, supra note 27, at 7.
37. Kahn, supra note 27, at 7.
38. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission is charged with the responsibility of
enforcing the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. §§
423.301-.311 (1955). With respect to religious discrimination in employment, the Michigan statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair employment practice:
(a) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry of any individual, to refuse to hire or otherwise to discriminate
against him with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, or any matter, directly or indirectly related to employment, except
where based on bona fide occupational qualification.
MrcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.303(3}(a) (1967).
39. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1970).
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Rebuffed by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, Dewey requested the United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance to
review his charges of religious discrimination. That body also found
Dewey's charges to be baseless.40
Turning to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), Dewey finally found success in January 1967.
Overruling the recommendations of its regional director, the EEOC
found that there was probable cause to believe that Reynolds had
engaged in unlawful employment practices.41 Accordingly, the Commission authorized Dewey to bring an action in federal district
court. 42
At the time when the EEOC first considered the Dewey matter,
its guidelines on religious discrimination provided that an employer
should try to "accommodate" the reasonable religious needs of its
employees when such accommodation could be accomplished without
serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.43 Subsequently,
40. 429 F.2d at 327.
41. 429 F.2d at 327.
42. Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) "authorized" the bringing of the Dewey action in federal district court, it
should be noted that the case authority construing the enforcement procedures applicable to an alleged title VII violation does not make such "authorization" or
"permission" an absolute prerequisite or condition precedent to maintaining such an
action. A claimant may not maintain his suit prior to giving the EEOC the statutorily
required "opportunity" to investigate and conciliate, but the weight of authority holds
that this opportunity, with or without an affirmative EEOC finding of "reasonable
cause" or EEOC notification of "inability to obtain voluntary compliance," will be
sufficient to establish jurisdiction in a federal court. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr.
Co., 3 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 74 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 1971). Even considering the contrary
authority, it is clear that something less than a Commission "authorization" is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to protect rights secured
under title VII. See Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969);
Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 918 (1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968);
Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 910 (1968); Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1967),
revd. and remanded on other grounds, 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Cox v.
United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969); Kendrick v. American Bakery
Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2012 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
43. The 1966 EEOC guidelines on religious discrimination read as follows:
(a) (1) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question
whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or to refuse to
hire a person whose religious observances re9.uire that he take time off during the
employer's regular workweek. These complaints arise in a variety of contexts,
but typically involve employees who regularly observe Saturdays as the Sabbath or
who observe certain special holidays during the year.
(2) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate to
the reaso;1able religious needs of employees and, in some cases, prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without serious inconvenience
to the conduct of the business.
(3) However, the Commission believes that an employer is free under Title
vn to establish a normal workweek (including paid holidays) generally ap•
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in July 1967, the Commission's guidelines were substantially
changed to shift to the employer "the burden of proving that undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable."44
plicable to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not operate
with uniformity in its effect upon the religious observances of his employees, For
example, an employer who is closed for business on Sunday does not discriminate
merefy because he requires that all his employees be available for work on Satur•
day. Likewise, an employer who closes his business on Christmas or Good Friday
is not thereby obligated to give time off with pay to Jewish employees for Rosh
Hashanah or Yom Kippur.
(b) While the question of what accommodation by the employer may reason•
ably be required must be decided on the pecular facts of each case, the 'following
guidelines may prove helpful:
(1) An employer may permit absences from work on religious holidays, with or
without pay, but must treat all religions with substantial uniformity in this
respect. However, the closing of a business on one religious holiday creates no
obligation to permit time off from work on another.
(2) An employer, to the extent he can do so without serious inconvenience to
the conduct of his business, should make a reasonable accommodation to the needs
of his employees and applicants for employment in connection with special religious holiday observances.
(3) The employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable overtime requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer to dis·
criminate on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the
job knowing or having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict
with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any alteration in such
requirements to accommodate his religious needs.
(4) Where an employee has previously been employed on a schedule which
does not conflict with his religious obligations and it becomes necessary to alter
his work schedule, the employer should attempt to achieve an accommodation
so as to avoid a conflict. However, an employer 1s not compelled to make such an
accommodation at the expense of serious inconvenience to the conduct of his
business or disproportionate allocation of unfavorable work assignments to other
employees.
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
44. The 1967 EEOC guidelines on religious discrimination read as follows:
(a} Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question
whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire
employees who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day
of the week, as the Sabbath or who observe certain special religious holidays
during the year and, as a consequence, do not work on such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds, required by section 703(a}(l) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes
an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to
the religious needs of employees and :erospective employees where such accommo•
dations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's
needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.
(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort
to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations
which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people.
EEOC Guidelines on Discrilnination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1970)
(emphasis added). Between the issuance of the June 15, 1966, guidelines and their
replacement by the new guidelines on July 10, 1967, the EEOC General Counsel
issued the following interpretative opinions regarding religious discrimination questions: an employment practice tbat discriminates against atheistic beliefs violates title
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After the EEOC had made its finding of probable cause in the

Dewey case, and after the issuance of the unfavorable award by
Arbitrator Kahn in June 1967, Dewey filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging that
Reynolds was guilty of religious discrimination under title VII. The
court, in a series of three decisions,45 dismissed Reynolds' contrary
contentions and ruled in Dewey's favor. These three decisions, plus
the two rendered on the appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit,46 aptly demonstrate the legal difficulties raised
by a requirement that a secular business institution adjust its operations in order to accommodate the varying religious needs of its
workers. Moreover, these decisions illustrate the conflict between the
guarantee of individual rights under title VII and the subjugation of
these asserted rights in the collective bargaining context.
In its first ruling in the case, the district court denied Reynolds'
motion to dismiss. 47 In support of its motion, Reynolds had argued
that, by filing a grievance under the contractual grievance procedure,
Dewey had made a final and binding election of remedies. Rejecting
this contention, the court emphasized that the issues treated by the
arbitrator were wholly different from those raised in a title VII suit.48
The court noted that the arbitrator had properly limited himself to
the contract and had never touched the issues raised under either the
Civil Rights Act or the first amendment. 49 The district court also
VII since the United States Constitution embraces religious liberty, includes the concept of "freedom from belief" as well as "freedom of belief" (Opinion Letter of EEOC
General Counsel, Aug. 2, 1966, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAC. 401:3013 (1966)); the requirement that employers treat all religions with "substantial uniformity" in granting
absences from work due to religious holidays does not prescribe precise mathematical
accuracy, and, thus, an employer does not violate title VII by giving Jewish employees
one or two religious holidays with pay while giving Christian employees none, when
the latter do receive certain legal holidays with pay that are also Christian holidays
(Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Oct. 3, 1966, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAC.
401:3026 (1966)); an employer violates title VII by not allowing substantially the same
amount of time off with substantially equivalent compensation when Jewish employees
are granted six paid religious holidays, but Christian employees are allowed only one
(Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, July 25, 1966, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc.
401:11010 (1966)); and an employer does not violate title VII by discharging and refusing
to rehire employees for failure to join a union in a plant covered by a lawful union
shop agreement, even though an employee claims that joining a labor union would be
contrary to his religious beliefs (Opinion Letter of EEOC Acting General Counsel, Jan.
26, 1967, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 401:3033 (1967)).
45. See notes 47, 52, &: 58 infra.
46. 429 F.2d 324- (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 429 F.2d 334- (6th Cir. 1970). See
notes 61-72 infra.
47. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
48. 291 F. Supp. at 789.
49. The district court never fully discussed how the first amendment is relevant in
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reasoned that Dewey "should not be penalized for first proceeding
with his contractual remedies through the arbitration process, as
preferred and indeed mandated by federal labor law." 150 The court
buttressed this latter conclusion by reasoning that, since the arbitration proceeding was not purely private but served also as a substitute
for traditional judicial remedies, the first amendment was applicable;
the court held, therefore, that "[t]he right in question, freedom to
exercise one's religion, is too precious to require plaintiff to accept
an arbitrator's decision regarding it." 51
In its second decision, 52 the district court found that the Company
had clearly discriminated against Dewey. In reaching this result, the
court placed principal reliance on two sources: first, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 53 striking
down as unconstitutional South Carolina's scheme of unemployment
compensation because it denied benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist
who had refused as a matter of religious principle to work on
Saturday; and, second, the more recent 1967 EEOC guidelines requiring an employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of its employees unless such accommodations impose
an "undue hardship" on the employer. 54 The court ruled that Reynolds had discriminated against Dewey because its compulsory
overtime requirement had the effect of forcing Dewey to choose
between his religion and his job; this discriminatory impact, the
court reasoned, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Sherbert.
Moreover, the court held that Reynolds had not carried its burden
of proof under the EEOC guidelines; that is, that Reynolds' evidence
that ten years ago it had experienced some difficulty in scheduling
production on Sunday was not sufficient to demonstrate a current
business "hardship." In addition, the court emphasized that the
Company rule that allowed Dewey to find a qualified replacement
was an insufficient accommodation, since a fundamental part of
the context of private employment and in the absence of governmental action; the
Sixth Circuit was no more helpful in its off-handed dismissal of any first amendment
considerations because of the lack of state action. 429 F .2d at 329. But cf. Linscott
v. Miller Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1869 (D. Mass. 1970). In any event, the district court's
reliance on the first amendment in the arbitration context, 291 F. Supp. at 789-90, has
serious implications-such as the incorporation of constitutional guarantees into arbitration-that certainly are not adequately dealt with in its opinion. Cf. Edwards, Due
Process Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 .ARB. J. (n.s.) 141 (1970).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

291 F. Supp. at 789.
291 F. Supp. at 790.

Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich 1969).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).

See note 44 supra.
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Dewey's religious beliefs prohibited him from asking anyone else to

work on Sunday. 15 is
The fashioning of proper relief posed some difficulty for the
court, because it recognized that the 1966 EEOC guidelines,56 which
were in effect at the time when Reynolds discharged Dewey, prescribed a scheme for reasonable accommodation that was far less
stringent than the 1967 guidelines relied on by the court. In effect,
the court suggested, without so stating, that Reynolds' conduct was
not an unlawful employment practice under the 1966 guidelines.
The court therefore ruled that, while reinstatement was appropriate,
back pay would be accorded Dewey only for the period of his discharge subsequent to August I, 1967, when Reynolds should have
had notice of the new guidelines. 57 Furthermore, by failing to strike
down the compulsory overtime provision, the court left it to the
parties to work out a reasonable accommodation for the future.
In its third decision in the case, 58 the district court refused to
stay Dewey's reinstatement, although it stayed the money judgment,
and ruled, again adversely to Reynolds, that good faith on the part of
the employer is not a viable defense to a suit brought under title
VII.150 It found that Reynolds had engaged in an unlawful employment practice by intentionally discharging Dewey for his refusal to
work Sunday and to find a replacement. 60
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, reversed. 61 The Sixth Circuit found
Sherbert inapplicable because it involved state action, whereas this
case involved private action. 62 It also found inapposite the 1967
EEOC guidelines relied on by the district court, ruling that the 1966
guidelines, in effect at the time of Dewey's discharge, were con55. Dewey claimed that asking someone else to work on Sunday was as much a
sin as was working himself. !100 F. Supp. at 715.
56. See note 4!1 supra.
57. !100 F. Supp. at 715 nl. The present guidelines became effective July 10, 1967.
The court never explained, however, why an award for back pay of the entire period
could not have been ordered on the basis of Sherbert v. Verner, which the court relied
on along with the guidelines. Perhaps the district court's reliance on Sherbert was
more apparent than real.
58. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., !104 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
59. 304 F. Supp. at 1121, See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964). Cf. Richards v. Griffith
Rubber Mills, !100 F. Supp. !1!18 (D. Ore. 1969).
60. !104 F. Supp. at 1121. The district court's treatment of the issue of intent was
less than satisfying. Implicit from the court's sparse discussion is the adoption of the
intent standard that is applied under the NLRA, which is the common-law test of
natural and foreseeable consequences. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 847 U.S.
17 (1954).
61. 429 F.2d !124 (6th Cir. 1970).
62. 429 F.2d at 329,
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trolling. 63 The court held that, in any event, the Company rule that
permitted Dewey to find a replacement was a reasonable accommodation to Dewey's religious beliefs even under the new guidelines and
thus Reynolds was under no present duty to alter its rules. 6 i The
court also disagreed with, and expressed grave concern about, the
district court's finding that the Company had intentionally engaged
in an unlawful employment practice, especially in light of the fact
that the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, the arbitrator, and the regional director of
the EEOC had all opined that Reynolds had not discriminated
against Dewey.65 The Sixth Circuit also amplified its dissatisfaction
with the trial court's ruling on the intent issue by referring to the fact
that the district court had based its decision, in large part, on the ex
post facto application of the new EEOC guidelines.66
In addressing itself to the issue of discrimination, the court of
appeals declared that title VII did not ban neutral actions by an
employer, such as the compulsory overtime requirement in issue in
Dewey. The court ruled that the ban extended only to those actions
taken with the intent of denying employment opportunity because
of the enumerated proscribed criteria. In this regard the court said:
The reason for Dewey's discharge was not discrimination on
account of his religion; it was because he violated the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement entered into by his union with
his employer, which provisions were applicable equally to all employees. The violation consisted not only of his refusing to work
on Sundays, but also his refusing to arrange for a replacement,
which was an alternate procedure. He did arrange for five replacements, but later refused even to do this, claiming that it was a sin.
He apparently did not regard it as sinful for him to collect wages
from an employer who was compelled to schedule overtime production in order to meet its contractual commitments and eventually
meet its payroll.
To accede to Dewey's demands would require Reynolds to discriminate against its other employees by requiring them to work
on Sundays in the place of Dewey, thereby relieving Dewey of his
GOntractual obligation. This would constitute unequal administration of the collective bargaining agreement among the employees,
and could create chaotic personnel problems and lead to grievances
and additional arbitrations. 67
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

429
429
429
429
429

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

at
at
at
at
at

329.
331.
331.
330.
330.
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On the issue of election of remedies, the Sixth Circuit ruled that
Dewey had made a final and binding election of remedies by taking
his grievance to arbitration. 68 Finding it anomalous that, under the
Steelworkers Trilogy, 69 the employer would be unable to relitigate
the discrimination question if the arbitrator had ruled against it, the
court ruled: "Where the grievances are based on an alleged civil
rights violation, and the parties consent to arbitration by a mutually
agreeable arbitrator, in our judgment the arbitrator has a right to
finally determine them." 70
On rehearing, the court of appeals again split two to one in
reversing the district court decision. 71 Emphasizing that the Act does
not require accommodation, the majority reiterated its opinion that
title VII prohibits only discrimination by design, rather than by
effect, and that under this standard the compulsory-overtime provision of the contract discriminated "against no one." 72 On the issue
of election of remedies, the majority noted two recent Fifth Circuit
cases73 that were at odds with its previous decision, but nevertheless
refused to reverse itself on the question.
Dewey thus brings into sharp focus some of the serious legal
questions that are necessarily involved in the enforcement of the title
VII prohibition of religious discrimination in employment. What
follows is an examination of the most important of these difficulties.
68. 429 F.2d at 331-32.
69. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of three cases decided by the Supreme Court
in 1960, which defined the scope of arbitration of labor contract disputes: Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
70. 429 F.2d at 331. Judge Combs, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit's decision,
emphasized the deference to be shown an administrative agency's interpretation
of the act it administers and noted that the prior EEOC guidelines also required
an "accommodation," albeit far less demanding than the accommodation mandated by
the 1967 guidelines. 429 F.2d at 333. Reiterating that Dewey's religious beliefs precluded his finding a replacement to work on Sunday, and finding no evidence offered
by Reynolds to indicate undue hardship, Judge Combs reasoned that Dewey's discharge violated title VII. 429 F.2d at 333-34. He also disagreed with that portion of
the majority opinion that ruled on the issue of election of remedies, noting that
Dewey's rights under the contract and under title VII were separate and distinct;
he noted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Bowe v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), had ruled that a plaintiff could utilize dual
prosecutions so long as the windfall of duplicate relief was not allowed. 429 F.2d at

334.
71. 429 F.2d at 334. In the interim, Judge Combs had resigned from the federal
bench to run for Governor of Kentucky; Judge McCree replaced Judge Combs on the
panel. Judge McCree dissented from the denial of rehearing. 429 F.2d at 337.
72. 429 F.2d at 336.
73. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Culpepper
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
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DEFINITION OF RELIGION

One problem that both courts avoided in Dewey was the definition of the term "religion." The district court found that there was
"no dispute as to the sincerity" of Dewey's religious beliefs,n and
this finding was not overturned on appeal. The court's finding is
significant not because it was determinative in Dewey, but rather
because it raises the question whether an employer could ever
launch a successful attack on the "religious" character of an asserted
religion or on the sincerity of an individual's professed religious beliefs. If religion is indeed to be defined with reference to an individual's "views of his relations to his Creator,''75 then there is no purely
objective standard available to judge the existence of the thing
against which discrimination is prohibited. Since religion under the
law may involve nothing more than a "deeply and sincerely" 76 held
belief, which may be "purely ethical or moral in source and content, "77 the mere assertion of belief will serve as prima fade evidence
of its genuineness. Unless the employer can point to some previous
specific and overt behavior that is patently inconsistent with the
individual's professed beliefs, it is questionable whether he can successfully challenge the employee's sincerity. Even overt conduct may
be insufficient, because consistency of conduct cannot be the test of
sincerity of belief since, under the law, the individual "must accommodate [his] idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life.'' 78
The cornerstone to any discussion of law and religion may be
found in the often-quoted words of Justice Miller: "The law knows
no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.'' 79 Justice Jackson, in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,80 put forward this same proposition in his
highly stylized prose: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

300 F. Supp. at 711.
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953).
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871).
319 U.S. 624 (l943).
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therein." 81 Freedom of religion, Justice Douglas emphasized in
United States v. Ballard, 82
embraces the right to maintain theories of life and death and of the
hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths
.... Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put
to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible
to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals
does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.83
Given these judicial pronouncements, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court has declared that "it is no business of courts to say
that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment."84
Built on the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment, this broad laissez-faire definition of religion is a reflection not only of the tolerance accorded differing beliefs in this
country, but of the virtual impossibility of distinguishing between
sincere and insincere religious beliefs. Based more on faith than on
reason, all religion, by definition, is somewhat irrational. For this
reason, erratic and inconsistent courses of action are meaningless in
testing the sincerity of one's religious beliefs; hence, the "reasonable
man," that amorphous, all-purpose source of guidance, is no help.
Perhaps no case better illustrates the irrationality of sincere religious
belief than Dewey itself.85 Prior to his conversion in 1961 to the Faith
Reformed Church, Dewey worked Sunday overtime without objection. Afterward, however, he perceived Sunday work as sinful and
stubbornly refused to perform it. Dewey did, however, allow Zagman
to replace him five times, until he came to view this substitution as
a sin also and told Zagman not to serve as his replacement. It is exasperating to ask how Zagman's replacement of Dewey was religiously
acceptable on August 14, 1966, but not so two weeks later. Although
Dewey's actions appear to brim with irrationality, they are no more
unreasonable than the practices of adherents of other religious sects.
For example, how can one rationally explain the practice of many
persons of the Jewish faith who maintain kosher homes, but who
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

319 U.S. at 642.
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
322 U.S. at 86-87.
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
Dewey is discussed in pt. I. supra.
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eat nonkosher food regularly at restaurants? Each has, after all, but
one stomach.
In short, since religion is based on a sometimes irrational faith,
consistency of belief cannot serve as a litmus paper test of conviction
or hypocrisy. The sincerity of one's religious beliefs simply cannot be
measured by mere mortals. As one commentator has aptly put it:
How sincere in his religious beliefs is a person who, while professing belief in the immortality of his soul and in rewards and
punishments in the next world seemingly spends his time doing
nothing but accumulating the things you can't take with you, or a
preacher who in the same breath will say that God is love and that
sinners are in the hands of an angry God? Who can weigh and
measure the quantity and quality in professions of religious faith? 86
Moreover, religious sincerity and religious verity are not separate and distinct; examination of the former must inevitably lead to
scrutiny of the latter. 87 Indeed, it seems somewhat fatuous to talk,
as do the EEOC guidelines,88 of reasonable accommodation without
first asking against whose standards the accommodation should be
measured. Applying its own standard of reasonableness, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals felt, and not ·without some justification,
that the scheme utilized by Reynolds that allowed employees to find
a replacement for Sunday overtime was more than reasonable. On
the other hand, as the district court quite properly pointed out,
under Dewey's religious scruples, which viewed allowing another
person to work in one's place as a sin equivalent to doing the work
oneself, Reynolds' accommodation was anything but reasonable.
The difficulty the courts have in judging the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs, and their consequent general refusal to do
so, is compounded by the expansive definition recently accorded the
term "religion" by the Supreme Court in a somewhat different context.
In Welsh v. United States, 89 the Court was confronted with the definition of "religious" under section 6G) of the Military and Selective
Service Act of 1967, which provides for the exemption of conscientious objectors from the draft. 90 Quoting its earlier holding in United
States v. Seeger91 that traditional or parochial concepts of religionincluding belief in a Supreme Being-result in too narrow a defini86. KONVITZ, supra note 13, at 101.
87. See, e.g., United States v. :Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93, 95 (1944) Gustice Jackson,
dissenting).
88. See note 44 supra.
89. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
90. 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
91. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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tion, the Court in Welsh reiterated the Seeger definition of the term
"religious": "The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption comes within the statutory definition." 92 The Court
then clarified this definition by stating that
[m]ost of the great religions of today and of the past have embodied
the idea of a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality-a God-who
communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right
and should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be
shunned. If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which
are purely ethical or moral in source and content but which nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in
the life of that individual "a place parallel to that filled by ... God"
in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a
religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a
"religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 60) as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional
religious convictions.ss

Although the Supreme Court in Welsh limited the scope of the
religious exemption to exclude those persons "whose beliefs are not
deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all
upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency," 94 the
Court's statutory interpretation nevertheless gave such a broad definition to "religion" that it may have opened a Pandora's box
of analogous definitional problems under title VII with respect
to religion. It is true that Welsh, in dealing with the conscientious-objector exemption from the draft, applies a statutory
scheme that is entirely different than the Civil Rights Act. However,
it is significant that both Welsh and Dewey deal with federal legislative schemes that, in effect, add flesh to the bare bones of the first
:::mendment. In each case the statute seeks to guarantee protection
for religious beliefs-protection against the draft requirement in
Welsh and protection against employment discrimination in Dewey.
Since the definition of "religious" or "religion" is crucial to an
explanation of the scope of the statutory protections under both the
Military and Selective Service Act and title VII, it would not be
92. 898 U.S. at 8!19.
98. 898 U.S. at 840.
94. !198 U.S. at 842-48.
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surprising to find the broad Welsh definition adopted in future title
VII cases.
For title VII purposes, the comprehensive definition of religion
in Welsh is no doubt quite proper; 95 however, a total incorporation
of the broad Welsh definition of religion with no concomitant restriction in the statutory construction of "discrimination" or "intent"
would produce some horrendous results in religious-discrimination
cases under title VII. For example, an employee could well feel that
going bowling every Wednesday night is central to his existence and
well-being, and that for him not to do so would constitute a sin. Is
he required to work overtime Wednesday nights? Absurd? Yes, but
is this example any more absurd than Dewey's belief? What if, instead of praying every Wednesday night, an employee believes that
working overtime in itself is sinful; or an employee shows up for
work only on those days when he doesn't hear the "call"? More
realistically, must an employer, under title VII, allow a Moslem employee to pray the five times a day required by his faith? What if we
call the employee's action a slowdown instead of prayer? This short
series of hypotheticals, while at first blush rather nonsensical, is not
so unrealistic. To many, Robert Dewey might appear to be an exception. But given a sufficiently expansive definition of religion and the
utter futility of challenging the sincerity of an individual's religious
beliefs, there will be countless Robert Deweys in this diverse country.DB

Arbitrator Kahn indicated in his decision that he was troubled by
these problems. He observed:
It is worth noting, perhaps, that Article IX, Section 3 [of the
collective bargaining agreement], applies explicitly to "all straight
time and overtime work." Suppose that an employee decided to join
a religious organization with a Wednesday Sabbath, and that he
thereafter refused to work on Wednesdays. It would be obvious, I
think, that the Company could properly find this employee in vio95. That title VII meant to incorporate a broad definition of religion is beyond
dispute. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history, which indicates that
an amendment to exempt atheists from the protection of title VII was defeated. See II0
CONG. R.Ec. 6568, 7217 (1964). See also Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Aug.
2, 1966, in BNA LAB. PoLicY & PRAc. 401:3013 (1966); Note, Title VII-Religious Discrimination in Employment-Is "Effect on Individual Religious Belief' Discrimination
Based on Religion Under the Civil Rights Act of 1961-1, 16 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 327, 333
(1969).
96. See, e.g., A.C. Rochat Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 421 (1967), in which bargaining with
a union was claimed to contravene the religious beliefs of an employer. Cf. Church of
Scientology v. Richardson, 39 U.SL.W. 2402, 2403 (9th Cir. Jan. II, 1971) (holding
that an instrument allegedly essential to the practice of Scientology could be barred
from importation upon administrative determination as a misbranded device without
evaluation of the "truth or falsity of any related 'religious' claims'?•
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lation of Rule II; yet, the language of this Agreement makes no
distinction for this purpose between straight time and overtime
work assignments. 97

On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit also alluded to this and other unorthodox religious practices and ruled: "The employer ought not
to be forced to accommodate each of the varying religious beliefs and
practices of his employees." 98
In sum, the necessarily broad definition of religion has a serious
impact on the sweep and possible effect of asserted title VII rights. In
defining the scope of those rights, this expansive and malleable
definition of religion cannot be ignored. Indeed, it serves to buttress
the argument, to which we next turn, that the definition of "discrimination" under title VII should be narrow and encompass only
intentional discrimination, rather than be the broader one of reasonable accommodation or the still broader one of discrimination by
effect.

JI!.

DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION

One of the central problems faced in Dewey was the definition of
religious discrimination under title VII. At least three such definitions are possible. First, title VII could be interpreted to prohibit only intentional and willful acts of discrimination-that is,
discrimination by intent-such as an employer's refusal to hire Jews
or Catholics because of their religion. Second, it would be possible
to construe title VII as prohibiting an employer action or rule that is
otherwise neutral on its face, such as a requirement that all workers
must work on Sunday, if the action is not uniform in its impact on
employees holding differing religious beliefs-in other words, discrimination by effect. Third, title VII could be construed as incorporating the more recent 1967 EEOC guidelines, which adopt the
discrimination-by-effect standard, but which allow for exculpation
(I) if the employer has made an effort reasonably to accommodate
the religious needs of the employee, or (2) if an accommodation cannot be made without undue hardship to the employer.
In Dewey, the Sixth Circuit on rehearing unmistakably limited
title VII's proscription to the intentional religious-discrimination
standard. Although the court toyed with the reasonable-accommodation theory in its first opinion, only to conclude, contrary to· the
district court, that Reynolds had made such an accommodation,99 its
97. Kahn, supra note Zl, at 7.
98. 429 F.2d at 885.
99. 429 F.2d at 881.
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second decision rejects any such requirement.100 The district court,
on the other hand, adopted both the EEOC standard of accommodation and, by badly straining Sherbert v. Verner, the discriminationby-effect standard.101 Thus, the series of opinions in Dewey brings
into focus the conflicting definitions of discrimination and illustrates
the scope that can be given to each. In order to resolve this conflict,
it is useful to look at the sources from which the proper definition of
discrimination can be gleaned.

A. The Legislative History
The most readily available source is, of course, the Act itself. At
first blush, however, title VII provides little help. Section 703(a)102
prohibits discrimination "because" of the categories there enumerated. What "because" means surely is open to dispute. Was Dewey
discharged because he refused to work Sundays or because of his religious beliefs? Or because Reynolds refused to make a reasonable
accommodation? Or because of all three? The word "because" is
simply too ambiguous to provide guidance.
Considerably more helpful are sections 703(h) and 706(g). The
former section declares that an employer is not guilty of unlawful
discrimination under the Act if he provides for different terms and
conditions of employment for his employees working at different
locations, "provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."103 The latter section allows for remedial relief in title
VII cases if it is found that the employer "has intentionally engaged
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice."104 Both sections seem to be directed only at discrimination by
intent. Indeed, this conclusion seems to be buttressed by some of
the legislative history of the Act.
The legislative history is admittedly sparse on this point, but
interpretative statements made by proponents of the Act give some
clues to the meaning of discrimination under title VII. For example,
some comments by Senator Hubert Humphrey-one of the principal
architects of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-lend support to the more
restrictive definition of "discrimination":
A new subsection 703(h) has been added, providing that it is not
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

429 F.2d at 335.
300 F. Supp. at 713-15.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
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an unlawful employment practice for an employer to maintain
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment either in
different locations or pursuant to a seniority, merit, or other incentive system, provided the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate on grounds of race, religion, or national origin.
For example, if an employer has two plants in different locations,
and one of the plants employs substantially more Negroes than
the other, it is not unlawful discrimination if the pay, conditions,
or facilities are better at one plant than at the other unless it is
shown that the employer was intending to discriminate for or
against one of the racial groups. Thus this provision makes clear
that it is only discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, that is forbidden by the title. This change does
not narrow application of the title, but merely clarifies its present
intent and effect.1 0:s
In regard to section 706(g), he added:
Section 706(g) is amended to require a showing of intentional
violation of the title in order to obtain relief. This is a clarifying
change. Since the title bars only discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin it would seem already to
require intent, and, thus, the proposed change does not involve any
substantive change in the title. The express requirement of intent is
designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or accidental discriminations will not violate the title or result in entry of court
orders. It means simply that the respondent must have intended to
discriminate. 106

If by "inadvertent or accidental discriminations" Senator Humphrey
had in mind neutral employer acts that are nondiscriminatory in application but discriminatory in effect, then his statements do indeed
give credence to the view that "discrimination" under title VII means
only discrimination by intent.
Further support for this narrow definition of discrimination can
be found in the views expressed by Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford
Case, the floor managers of the Civil Rights Act. In their interpretative memorandum concerning title VII, they noted, inter alia:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is
vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings.
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment
or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are
based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex
105. IIO
106. IIO

CONG,
CoNG.

REc. 12,723 (1964).
REc. 12,723·24 (1964) (emphasis added).
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and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employment is not affected by this title. 1 01
Under this narrow view, Reynolds surely did not discriminate against
Dewey, since it applied its compulsory overtime requirement and
replacement scheme evenhandedly. Indeed, under the Clark-Case
standard, Reynolds, by accommodating Dewey's religious beliefs as
it was required to do under the EEOC guidelines, would arguably be
guilty of an unlawful employment practice under title VII, for such
an accommodation would seemingly constitute favored treatment.
This narrow definition of discrimination is also sustained by a
memorandum prepared by the Justice Department in reply to Senator Lister Hill's argument that title VII would undermine seniority
systems. This memorandum noted:
Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker
is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole" he is not
being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the
seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under
Title VII. If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off
before any white man, such a rule could not serve as the basis for a
discharge subsequent to the effective date of the title.108
In distinguishing between a system that is based on the equal application of a rule-for example, seniority-and one that relies on
the prohibited categories-for example, requiring all Negroes to be
laid off first-the Justice Department's memorandum is clearly
premised on the narrow definition of discrimination.

B.

The Problem of Race Discrimination

While the legislative history of title VII appears to support the
narrow view of discrimination-and it surely does not give explicit
support to the broader discrimination-by-effect view-the courts have
nevertheless been reluctant to embrace the former definition, probably because of the difficult and subtle problems posed by racial,
rather than religious, discrimination under the Act. 109 Even before
107. 110 CONG, REC, 7213 (1964).
108. 110 CONG, REc. 7207 (1964).
109. On March 8, 1971, as this Article was going to print, the Supreme Court
rendered its first significant interpretation of title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971). In Griggs the Court was faced with a case involving the present effects of past willful race discrimination against black workers.
After the employer abandoned his policy of overt discrimination, he initiated a new
policy that required a high-school diploma and completion of intelligence tests for all
jobs from which blacks had previously been excluded. In holding these requirements
to be in violation of title VII, the Court ruled:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language
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the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal courts attempted to curb racial bigotry by finding discrimination in cases in
which a requirement that was nondiscriminatory on its face led in
practice to a discriminatory result. The decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Meredith v. Fair110 is a good example of this approach. Meredith involved a requirement at the University of Mississippi that, in order to be admitted to the university, an applicant
was required to furnish the names of six university alumni who could
attest to the applicant's good character. On its face such a requirement appears nondiscriminatory; but since there were no Negro
graduates of the university, it was virtually impossible for a Negro
applicant to have six alumni attest to his good character. Consequently, the requirement was found to be discriminatory.
Given the historical patterns and traditions of racism in the United
States, and in light of the strong congressional mandate embodied in
the Civil Rights Act to eliminate the "glaring ... discrimination
against Negroes,"111 it is not surprising that some federal courts have
adopted the broad definition of discrimination in title VII cases.112
But this judicial approach may be unnecessary, a possibility that can
be demonstrated again with reference to Meredith. While Meredith
seems to support the broad discrimination-by-effect definition, it may
actually be a better example of the narrow discrimination-by-intent
view. The rule being challenged in Meredith was innocuous on its
face, but the court recognized that the rule was deliberately established for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes.113 Thus, it
can be legitimately asserted that the case really involved intentional
discrimination; it would be a good example of discrimination by
effect only if the court had assumed that the University of Mississippi
had established the alumni rule without intending to discriminate.
of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.••• What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification•••• The Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
39 U.S.L.W. at 4319.
BO. 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962).
lll. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963).
ll2. See, e.g., United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); Gregory
v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
llll. 298 F.2d at 701.
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That assumption, however, would surely have been contrary to fact.
The point of this analysis is to suggest that the courts need not
adhere to a broad definition of discrimination in race cases under
title VII because the desired results may be satisfactorily achieved
under the more limited heading of discrimination by intent. In other
words, in the race cases, a finding of an unlawful employment practice
based on the present effects of past acts of willful discriminationm
should be classified as discrimination by intent, not by effect; 116 the
discriminatory effects in such cases are premised, in the first instance,
on an intent or design to treat Negroes differently from whites. Either
definition scheme will lead to the same result in cases of racial discrimination, but the adoption of a standard of discrimination by intent will produce entirely different results in religious-discrimination
cases than will a standard of discrimination by effect.

The Role of the EEOC in Fashioning a Definition
of Discrimination
In grappling with the problem of defining religious discrimination under title VII, another source of guidance is, of course, the
EEOC. As the Supreme Court has noted, "When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to
the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged
with its administration."116
Although the EEOC is surely a source of guidance in construing
title VII, there are two compelling reasons here to suggest that the
role of the Commission, in fashioning a definition of "discrimination," should be somewhat circumscribed. One of these reasons was
suggested long ago by the Supreme Court:
C.

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.111

Thus, in a case such as Dewey, the weight of judicial deference to be
114. See Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
115. This point is amplified in the text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
116. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Accord, Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 39 U.S.L.W. 4160, 4161 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1971) (Justice Marshall, concurring in the
per curiam decision); Idaho Sheet Metal Works v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 205 (1966).
117. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (emphasis added).
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accorded the Commission's judgment is a function of the thoroughness, validity, and consistency in the EEOC reasoning. In Dewey there
were two sets of EEOC guidelines for religious discrimination that
seriously conflicted with one another: the earlier 1966 guidelines
that limited the proscription to intentional discrimination and
arguably did not require accommodation in a Dewey-type situation;118 and the more recent 1967 guidelines that broadened the impact of the former guidelines to require accommodation in such circumstances.119 Given this reversal of position by the EEOC, there is
a serious question whether the EEOC's judgment lacks "consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements."120 Moreover, as will be
shown,121 the EEOC has been inconsistent in applying its accommodation formulation: it has treated a charge of religious discrimination
differently when the charge is based on the application of a union
shop provision than when based on other provisions of a collective
bargaining contract, such as the compulsory overtime provision in
issue in Dewey.
The second reason suggesting that the role of the EEOC should be
circumscribed here is the statutory scheme of enforcement under
title VII. Under the Act, the EEOC has no enforcement power; 122
moreover, under its own interpretation of the statute, the Commission is without power to prevent a party from bringing a court action
if the party himself rejects the settlement reached between the EEOC
and the employer. 123 The Commission's view is in accord with court
decisions124 that have emphasized that "under Title VII, the charging
party and suing plaintiff acts as a private attorney general"125 and
that the primary responsibility for the adjudication of rights under
title VII rests with the courts, not with the Commission.126 This view
also comports with the legislative history of the Act, which indicates
118. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966), set forth in note 43 supra. See text accompanying
note 132 infra.
119. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1970), set forth in note 44 supra. See text accompanying
notes 133-39 infra.
120. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 142-46 infra.
122, The United States Senate recently voted to give the EEOC the power to issue
cease-and-desist orders in order to enforce title VII. Equal Employment Opportunity
Enforcement Act of 1970, S. 2453, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). However, the House version of the bill stalled in the Rules Committee and did not clear the House before
expiration of the 91st Congress. Proponents of the legislation thus will have to begin
again and win both Senate and House passage in the new Congress.
123. Letter from the EEOC Director of Compliance to U.S. Gypsum Co., June 19,
1967, cited in Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 84 (N.D. Ind. 1968),
124. See, e.g., Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970).
125. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969).
126. Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Culpepper
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
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that Congress did not intend to place "the Commission in the Court
House door."127
Given this lack of enforcement power and the inconsistent behavior of the EEOC, perhaps it is not surprising to find that the
Commission, which filed an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit in support of Dewey's petition for a rehearing, implicitly urged the court to
ignore its guidelines.128 Recognizing that the 1966 guidelines, not the
more stringent 1967 guidelines relied on by the district court, were
in effect when Dewey was discharged,12 9 the EEOC attempted in its
brief to soft-pedal the significance of the district court's ex post facto
application of the later 1967 guidelines, arguing that
[t]he timing of the Commission interpretations is irrelevant, since as
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Fekete v. U.S.
Steel, 2 FEP Cases at p. 543:
But in this role of investigator and conciliator, the Commission
is not the final arbiter of an individual's grievance.
Although the Court is to accord great weight to the Commission's
interpretation of the statute .•• it may not deprive the plaintiff of
relief from the unlawful employment practice by turning to a defunct Commission guideline.1ao

In circumstances such as these, when the EEOC itself has argued that
its guidelines should be ignored, the courts should show grudging, if
any, deference to the Commission's judgment.
Since the courts may decide that, despite the preceding arguments,
the Commission does have a purposeful role to play in construing
religious discrimination under the Act, it may be useful here to review some of the EEOC interpretations concerning the obligations
of an employer under title VII. The Commission's first religious
guidelines, issued June 15, 1966,131 required an employer to make
only very limited accommodation for his employees' religious be127. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74, 84 (N.D. Ind. 1968). The
district court in United States Gypsum derived its "Court House door" phrase from a
comment by Senator Javits that illustrated that the EEOC was not intended to be the
only party with standing to sue under title VII: "The Commission may find the claim
invalid; yet the complainant still can sue, and so may the Attorney General, if he
finds reasonable cause for doing so. In short the Commission does not hold the key
to the courtroom door." 110 CONG. REc. 13,697 (1964), quoted in 284 F. Supp. at 83.
128. :Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
129. Under the Act, an employer is relieved from liability under title VII for the
alleged commission of an unlawful employment practice if he "pleads and proves that
the act of omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity with and in
reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the commission." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-12(b)(l) (1964).
l!lO. :Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
131. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966). See note 43 supra.
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liefs, and required none at all if the result would be either serious
inconvenience to the employer or disproportionate allocation of unfavorable work. Moreover, the 1966 guidelines stated that an employer could prescribe a work week applicable to all employees, even
though such a schedule did not operate with uniformity in its effect
upon the religious beliefs of all employees. Of greatest importance in
the Dewey situation, the guidelines provided:
(3) The employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable overtime requirements, and, absent an intent on the part of
the employer to discriminate on religious grounds, a job applicant
or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to
believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious
obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to accommodate his religious needs.132

At the time of Dewey's conversion the compulsory overtime requirement was part of the collective bargaining agreement; therefore,
under the Commission's 1966 guidelines, Reynolds was not guilty of
discrimination.
Under the new guidelines, effective July 10, 1967,133 the reasonable-accommodation provision is far more stringent; an employer can
avoid the requirement that he make reasonable accommodation only
by carrying the burden of proving undue hardship. Employers have
been able to meet this burden only in truly compelling cases-for
example, when the job required availability on a seven-day-a-week,
round-the-clock basis,134 or when a short harvesting season necessitated
attendance every day for six weeks.135 In more pedestrian cases-for
example, when an Orthodox J ew136 or a member of the Radio Church
of God137 wanted to leave work early on Friday nights, or when an
employee was absent several Saturdays because of his religious beliefs138-the Commission has found that the employer had not met its
burden of proving undue hardship. In fact, in the last case, the Commission used rather sweeping language in defining discrimination.
It ruled: "[W]hile a rule may apply equally to all employees, it may
well have unequal impact on them.... A rule which forces a person
to choose between his religion and his job limits that person's exercise of his religion and is thereby discriminatory in its effect.''139
lll2.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
lll8.
139.

31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966). See note 43 supra.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1970). See note 44 supra.
EEOC Dec. No. 70773, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 686 (May 7, 1970).
EEOC Dec. No. 7099, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 227 (1969).
EEOC Dec. No. 70716, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 684 (April 23, 1970).
EEOC Dec. No. 70670, 2 FAIR ElllPL. PRAc. CAS. 586 (March 30, 1970).
EEOC Dec. No. 70580, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 516 (March 2, 1970).
2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. at 516.
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D. The Impact of the EEOC Definition of Discrimination
Before moving on, it might be useful to consider the impact and
breadth of the Commission's rules. Assume that an employer operates
a seven-day-a-week operation, that he has entered into a collective
bargaining contract with a union, and that the contract provides for
shift preference by seniority. What if a low-seniority employee, who
works a shift that includes Saturday and Sunday, converts to a religion
that requires him not to work on one of those days? Must the employer then transfer this employee out of a Sunday or Saturday shift
even though numerous employees with greater seniority are required
to work over the weekend? Under the EEOC guidelines, the transfer
of one employee could hardly be said to create an "undue hardship"
for the employer, but what of the other employees? What of the hardship imposed on the employee who waited a long time to acquire
sufficient seniority in order to avoid weekend work and is now forced
back into it because of someone else's religious beliefs? Axe the
religious beliefs of one individual so weighty that they supersede the
lack of religious beliefs of another? Or suppose a job applicant informs his prospective employer that he cannot work Sundays, a day
that he would be expected to work because of his lack of seniority.
Does the employer discriminate by not offering the applicant a job?
Again, in the absence of "undue hardship"-which is nearly impossible to demonstrate if the work force is large enough-the employer would be guilty of discrimination unless he gave the job applicant a non-Sunday shift, something to which the applicant would
not be entitled but for his religious beliefs. Compare this problem
with that of an employee who wants to take a few weeks off for a
pilgrimage or one who refuses to work Sunday overtime, as Dewey
did.
The thrust of this argument is that the reasonable-accommodation formulation imposes a priority of the religious over the secular.
Freedom of religion necessarily includes the freedom not to believe,
as well as the freedom to believe.140 Who is to say that the desire to
stay home Sunday and do nothing is any less worthy of protection
than is the need to attend church that same day? But the EEOC's
standard clearly chooses the one over the other. In so doing, it misconceives not only title VII but the delicate balance between the free
exercise of religion and the operation of a secular society.141
140. The first amendment guaranty of religious freedom has been recognized as
extending protection to members of secular society against governmental action that
. is invoked "because of their faith, or lack of it." Everson v. Board of Educ., lll!O U.S.
1, 16 (1947).
141. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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It is curious, however, that the Commission has not applied its
reasonable-accommodation standard uniformly to all provisions of a
collective bargaining contract. In fact, the Commission has opined
from the outset that an employer who, pursuant to a union shop
provision, requires an employee to join a union contrary to the
employee's religious beliefs does not discriminate against that employee by discharging him for refusing to join the union.142 The
Commission's General Counsel has taken the position that, since
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) specifically permits union
shop agreements without providing for religious exemptions,143 a
discharge for failure to join a union does not constitute discrimination under title VII. 144 The EEOC has never satisfactorily explained,
however, why a union shop provision should be treated differently
from any other provision in a collective bargaining contract-for
example, a compulsory overtime provision. Granted, the NLRA
specifically allows a union shop agreement, but section 8(d) 145 of the
same Act has been construed to permit union and employer agreements on compulsory overtime; indeed, an employer violates the
Act if he refuses to bargain over such a clause.146 If there is a distinction between the two types of provisions, it is one without a
difference.
Union shop provisions have, of course, been upheld under both
the Railway Labor Act147 and the NLRA148 as not infringing the first
amendment rights of employees who refused to join, and were later
discharged, because of their religious scruples. These decisions have
recently received implied support from the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari in Russell v. Catherwood,149 a case in which a New York
appellate court disallowed unemployment compensation eligibility
142. The Commission adopted this position prior to the promulgation of any
guidelines. See Opinion of the EEOC General Counsel, G.C. 641-65, Dec. 29, 1965,
in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 401:1006 (1967). The Commission's position remained unchanged after the 1966 guidelines were formulated. See Opinion Letter of EEOC Acting
General Counsel, Jan. 26, 1967, in BNA LAB. POLICY &: PRAc. 401:3033 (1967).
143. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
144. Opinion Letter ·of EEOC Acting General Counsel, Jan. 26, 1967, in BNA LAB.
POLICY &: PRAC. 401:3033 (1967).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958);
NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953).
147. See, e.g., Gray v. Gulf, M. &: O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
39 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1971); Wicks v. Southern Pacific Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th
Cir. 1956); Otten v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
148. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970).
149. 33 App. Div. 2d 592, 304 N.Y.S.2d 415, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 936 (1970). See also
Stimpel v. California State Personnel Bd., 6 Cal App. 3d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr. 797, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970).
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for an individual who refused to accept jobs that would require him
to join a union. 150
In the context of its reasonable-accommodation requirement, the
Commission would do well to consider the remarks of Judge Learned
Hand in a union shop case, Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.151
In rejecting a first amendment attack on the constitutionality of a
union shop provision under the Railway Labor Act, he said:
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government, though even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one
the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities. A man
might find it incompatible with his conscience to live in a city in
which open saloons were licensed; yet he would have no constitutional right to insist that the saloons must be closed. He would have
to leave the city or put up with the iniquitous dens, no matter what
economic loss his change of domicil entailed. We must accommodate
our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises
necessary in communal life; and we can hope for no reward for the
sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfaction from within, or
our expectations of a better world.152

In sum, the current EEOC guidelines are contradictory, both in
terms of present application and in light of the prior guidelines;
furthermore, they appear to be premised on a fundamentally distorted conception of the proper place of religion in a secular society.
E. Legal Precedent and Constitutional Considerations
A more helpful aid in fashioning a definition of discrimination
may be the judicial precedents that have been formulated under the
first amendment, under title VII, and under state FEP laws. Of
central import in this connection is Sherbert v. Verner. 153 The Sixth
Circuit, in its review of Dewey, was not terribly helpful in its treatment of the applicability of Sherbert since it dismissed the case with
the comment that it "involved state, and not private action." 15 i The
comment is correct, but it sheds no light on the parameters set forth
150. Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Burger dissented to the denial of certiorari
on the grounds that the case raised serious first amendment difficulties. 399 U.S. at 936.
151. 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).
152. 205 F.2d at 61. In Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (D.
Mass. 1970), the district court noted that
[a] purely private employer has a common law freedom to dismiss at will an employee who has no contrary contract.••• While that freedom has been curbed
by statutes such as the NLR Act and the Civil Rights Act of July 2, 1964 ••• no
federal statute • • • precludes [an employer) from acting pursuant to a union
shop contract (which has no avowed or covert purpose to discriminate on religious, racial, or like prohibited ground) to dismiss an employee for nonpayment of
union dues. Nor does the First Amendment apply to a wholly private employer's
act to terminate, pursuant to the common law, employment of one of his workers,
153. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
154. 429 F.2d at 329.
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in Sherbert of permissible state interference with religious beliefs,
or on how the rationale may affect the somewhat parallel problem in
Dewey under title VII.
Sherbert involved South Carolina's refusal, on the ground that
she was unavailable for work, to give unemployment compensation
benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who declined to work on Saturday. While the Supreme Court often used rather broad language in
its opinion striking down this phase of South Carolina's scheme of
unemployment compensation, it clearly held that if a legislative
scheme could be justified by a compelling state interest within the
state's police power, then any incidental burden on the free exercise
of religion would not render the scheme unconstitutional. The
Court, however, found no such compelling state interest present in
Sherbert. It distinguished the cases involving Sunday closing laws,
which impose an additional burden on Orthodox Jews and Seventh
Day Adventists, on the grounds that there was a compelling state
interest in those cases. The Court held:
In these respects, then, the state interest asserted in the present
case is wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify
the less direct burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld v.
Brown, supra. The Court recognized that the Sunday closing law
which that decision sustained undoubtedly served "to make the
practice of [the Orthodox Jewish merchants] ... religious beliefs
more expensive." 366 U.S. at 605, 81 S. Ct., at 1147. But the statute
was nevertheless saved by a countervailing factor which finds no
equivalent in the instant case-a strong state interest in providing
one uniform day of rest fot all workers. That secular objective could
be achieved, the Court found, only by declaring Sunday to be that
day of rest. Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present an administrative problem of
such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a competitive advantage that such a requirement would have rendered the
entire statutory scheme unworkable. In the present case no such
justifications underlie the determination of the state court that
appellant's religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits.ms

Sherbert, of course, can be read as lending support to the EEOC's
guidelines if "compelling state interest" can be equated with "undue
hardship." For several reasons, however, such an argument is open to
criticism. First, the equation simply does not balance. The relationship of government and the individual under the first amendment is
wholly different than the employment relationship, especially when
a collective bargaining agreement operates alongside title VII. The
first amendment has long been the bulwark of individual rights, and
155. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
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the Court has viewed group values to be less compelling than those
asserted by individuals. Thus, if a crowd dislikes what a speaker is
saying, it is the responsibility of the police not to quiet the speaker,
but to calm the crowd.156 Similarly, what is viewed as obscene by a
jury has frequently been held to be constitutionally protected.157
On the other hand, in the context of collective bargaining under
our national labor policy as embodied in the NLRA, the Court has
emphasized the subjugation of the interests of the individual to those
of the group-the union.158 Thus, in the absence of hostility or unfair representation, a union can deprive an individual of his seniority
rights159 or settle a grievance adversely to an individual employee,160
even though the individual objects. In the collective bargaining set·
ting, it makes little sense to require a compelling interest to uphold
an evenhandedly applied contractual provision against a claim of
uneven impact on an employee's religious beliefs since such a rule
would obviously impair the effectiveness of the recognized statutory
bargaining representative.161
Indeed, in the context of a collective bargaining contract, evenhanded administration may well serve as the sort of compelling interest required by Sherbert. This rationale has served as the basis
of the awards of arbitrators who have been confronted with individual employee claims of religious discrimination resulting from the
uneven impact of contractual provisions. As one arbitrator has said:
This Arbitrator is most sympathetic with anyone in these days
who adheres sincerely and devoutly to the tenets of a truly religious
belief. But he is also fully mindful of the chaos which would follow
the application of the principle that any employee can determine
for himself, for reasons sufficient to him, whether he will regularly
not work on a work day which management has the right to schedule. The Arbitrator therefore can find no adequate basis for finding
that the contract-granted right of the Company to require Saturday
work from X-was not reasonable.162
156. See City of Chicago v. Gregory, 394 U.S. Ill (1969).
157. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964), and cases cited therein.
158. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See also Edwards, Due Process Considerations
in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. (n.s.) 141 (1970).
159. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953).
160. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
161. The need for uniformity in the application of the law of labor relations was
emphasized by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957), in which the Court declared that, under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), law is to be uniform throughout the country in
both the federal and state systems.
162, Combustion Engineering, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 204, 206 (1967).
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Another arbitrator has noted:
What Shaw is asking for is a unique kind of treatment applicable to
him and not to others who may have different, but equally valid,
reasons for avoiding their work schedules. To adopt a special rule
excepting Shaw from working his work schedule would be unfair
to all other employees, and discriminatory against them. Shaw himself must realize that if a new rule was made to accommodate each
and every religious conviction, the plant's work schedules would
soon be reduced to a haphazard and chaotic state.163
In Andrews v. O'Grady,164 this same theme emerges. There, a
New York City bus driver, who was a Seventh Day Adventist, charged
that his first amendment rights were violated when the New York
Transit System fired him for his refusal to work on Saturday. In
upholding his discharge, the New York court noted:
There can be no doubt, from long experience, that the seniority
rules to which petitioner has refused to conform are the only fair
way to assure that every man is treated on a nondiscriminatory basis
with respect to work assignments. These time-honored rules are,
therefore, most essential to the efficient and safe operation of the city
transportation system.165
Many of these same considerations also underlie the refusal of courts
and the National Labor Relations Board to overturn union shop
provisions on religious grounds166 and their rejection of religious
belief as a defense to an unfair labor practice charge under the
NLRA.101
Sherbert, then, is inapposite, not only because the relationship of
government to the individual in the first amendment setting is
different than the relationship between the individual and the
group in the collective bargaining context; but also because the
evenhanded application of a collective bargaining contract is of
crucial significance. This latter viewpoint has been adopted by
numerous labor arbitrators, and, as the Supreme Court has often
indicated, their judgment should not be ignored.168 Finally, it should
be noted that the Court in Sherbert, in its discussion of the Sunday16!1. John Morrell & Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 280, 282 (1951). See also Singer Co., 48 Lab.
Arb. 1!14!1 (1967).
164. 44 Misc. 2d 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
165. 44 Misc. 2d at !l!I, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
166. See notes 152-5!1 supra and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., A.C. Rochat Co., 16!1 N.L.R.B. 421 (1967).
168. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
36!1 U.S. 593 (1960),
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closing-law case, indicated that once a compelling state interest was
shown, the state was not required to make an accommodation to any
member of the affected class.169 Similarly, in the context of alleged
religious discrimination under title VII, given the need for uniform
application of contractual provisions, no finding of discrimination
should be made nor accommodation required unless it is shown that
the contract clause in question was intentionally designed to achieve
the prohibited discrimination. Otherwise, the "accommodation"
itself will establish a pattern of discrimination that favors and
exempts certain religious believers from their obligations to perform under admittedly lawful contract provisions.17°
Another line of cases that deserves mention in grappling with the
definition of discrimination involves alleged racial discrimination in
the application of hiring practices and seniority systems.171 Read
broadly, these cases arguably establish "effect" as the key to the working definition of discrimination. A closer examination of these
cases, however, reveals that, while the seniority system or referral
system in question might currently be racially neutral, its present
discriminatory effect, despite evenhanded administration, is the
product of past racial discrimination in the most blatant subjective
form. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
recently recognized this problem in United States v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 38,172 in which it held:
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative
relief authorization above are read in context with § 2000e-2G), we
believe that section cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief
against continuation of effects of past discrimination resulting from
present practices (neutral on their face) which have the practical
effect of continuing past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of
the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This could
result from adoption of devices such as a limitation of new apprentices to relatives of the all-white membership of a union, Int'l Ass'n
of Heat&: Frost Insulators&: Asbestos Wkrs., Local 53 v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969), or limitation of membership to persons
who had previous work experience under union contract, while
such experience was racially limited to whites, United Papermakers
169. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
170. Cf. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970). See generally
P. KURLAND, OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 26 (1961).
171. See, e.g., United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); Local
189 Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), revd., 39
U.SL.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971). See note 109 supra.
172. 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
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& Paperworkers, Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969) ••••173

The finding of discrimination in these cases, therefore, is premised
on the fact that at one time discrimination by design was present
and that such discrimination is carried forward to the present by
practices that appear racially neutral.174
Given this special situation in the racial-discrimination cases, it
is not at all anomalous that the Sixth Circuit seems to define discrimination more narrowly in Dewey than in International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local 38. Actually, it can be argued that the
court adheres to the view of discrimination by intent in both cases,
but that in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
38 the court recognizes that discrimination by intent, once committed, cannot be corrected by the mere declaration of a defendantemployer or union-that it will mend its ways in the future. Rather,
the court finds that willful discrimination previously practiced must
be destroyed "root and branch,"175 and applies this standard to
"sophisticated as well as simple minded modes of discrimination." 176
In addition to the legal precedent discussed above, there are
numerous cases arising under state FEP laws that also lend support
to the narrow definition of discrimination.177 A good recent example
is In re Eastern Greyhound Lines Division of Greyhound Lines,
Incorporated v. New York State Division of Human Rights.178 In
that case, a bearded Orthodox Muslim was not hired for a job as a
baggage handler because the employer had a rule against its employees wearing beards. The job applicant claimed discrimination,
arguing that wearing a beard was decreed by his religion. Rejecting
his claim, the New York Court of Appeals declared that religious
173. 428 F.2d at 149-50.
174. See, e.g., Griggs v- Duke Power Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971).
175. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
176. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960).
177. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. California FEPC, 7 RACE REL.
L. REP. 164 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1962); IBEW, Local 35 v. Commn. on Civil Rights,
140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953); Strong v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 351 Mass. 554, 222 N.E.2d 885 (1967); Andrews v. O'Grady, 44 Misc. 2d 28, 252
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1964); In re Council v_ Donovan, 40 Misc. 2d 744,750,244 N.Y.S.2d
199,205 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Several commentators have also taken the narrower interpretation.
One commentator has stated: "In order to prove that an employer has unlawfully discriminated against either a job applicant or an employee, it must be shown that he
relied on one of the forbidden criteria in making a personnel selection." Mittenthal,
The Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, 35 MICH. ST. B.J. No. 5, at 47 (1956)
(emphasis added). See also Note, An American Legal Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination,
17 U. CHI. L. REv. 107, 110 (1949).
178. 27 N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322, afjg. 34 App. Div. 2d 916, 311
N.Y.S.2d 465 (1970).
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discrimination could not be equated with an employer's failure to
accommodate since the two are entirely different concepts; and that,
therefore, the employer was not required to make an exception to its
established personnel policies in order to accommodate the religious
practices of a potential employee. It concluded:
Policy resting on a desire to promote business by greater public
support could justify the exclusion by an employer of beards and
have no possible religious connotation. Such a rule, so motivated,
as it affected employment, would not come within the bar of the
statute unless it be shown, that which is not shown here: the employment decision was in fact actuated by discrimination against creed.179

This decision seems correct, at least with respect to its disposition of
the charge of religious discrimination. No evidence indicated that
the employer did not like Orthodox Muslims; rather, its standing
rule against employees' wearing beards cut across racial and religious
grounds.
In sum, the legislative history of title VII, arbitration rulings,
and court decisions would appear to support the narrow definition
of discrimination-that is, that only intentional discrimination is
proscribed. In taking this position, however, due recognition should
be accorded the compelling concern of the draftsmen of title VII
with racial discrimination. As has been noted,180 the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was drafted with an eye toward eliminating some of the
severe patterns of race discrimination in the United States. In order
to effect this primary goal, it could be argued that the courts should
be inventive in their application of the proscriptions against race
discrimination. Judicial inventiveness in this area, albeit sometimes
analytically troublesome, may surely be defended on policy grounds.
However, as pointed out above, it is unnecessary for the courts to
move beyond the proscription of intentional discrimination in
order to give full effect to the strong statutory policy against race
discrimination in employment.181
179. 27 N.Y.2d at 282, 265 N.E.2d at 746-47, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
180. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
181. Compare discussion in pt. m. B. supra with the decision in Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). In race discrimination cases, the EEOC
has consistently argued that if a rule, othenvise neutral on its face, has a disproportionate impact on a protected group (e.g., Negroes), then the rule should be found
unlawful under title VII. Gregory, in effect, adopts this broad definition of intent
under title VII. See also FEP Dec. No. 71332, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 1016 (1970), in
which it was held that there was reasonable cause to believe that an employer violated
title VII by its refusal to hire an unwed Negro woman. (In the county where the employer did business, 80% of the reported illegitimate babies were born to nonwhites
and 29% of the population was Negro.)
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Even if the proper definition of discrimination for the other
categories of title VII-sex, race, and national origin-is arguably
a broad one,182 the definition of "religious discrimination," especially
when coupled with the broad definition of "religion,'' should be
narrow. This distinction is justified because the social impact of
religious discrimination is far less grave, as the legislative history of
title VII surely indicates,183 than is the impact of racial discrimination. Moreover, and most significant in this respect, the individual
has free choice in the pursuit of religion, but is unalterably born of
a certain race, sex, and ancestry.
IV.

THE MEANING OF INTENT

Even if the hurdle of the definition of discrimination has been
cleared, our inquiry is not ended. For if putting a fixed meaning on
discrimination is difficult, defining "intent" is no less so.
The conclusion reached above, that discrimination by intent and
not discrimination by effect should be the proper test under title VII,
leaves open the meaning of "intent." In its strictest sense, discrimination by intent is a willful act consciously performed for the specific
purpose and design of achieving the forbidden result.184 At the other
extreme, "intent" may be defined with reference to the "natural and
foreseeable consequences" test.185 Since it is not easy to search the
human soul and ascertain individual motivation, the courts, especially in the labor field, have long ruled that a person will be held to
intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of his acts. 186 Indeed,
this rationale has seemingly been applied in some of the court
This definition of discrimination is at best uniquely applicable in race and sex
cases, in which the group is easily identifiable. However, in a case involving alleged
religious discrimination, this definition breaks down because religion, unlike race and
sex, is not self-defining. Race is normally defined with reference to black (Negro),
white (Caucasian), yellow (Oriental), and red (Indian) population groups in the United
States, and sex means the male or female groups; however, religion, as shown in pt.
II. supra, is virtually without meaningful definition, especially if nonbelievers fall
within the scope of religion. The EEOC rule with respect to "disproportionate impact" (see text accompanying note 139 supra) could arguably have some application in
a religion case, if, for example, the facts were similar to those above and 80% of the
reported illegitimate babies were born to Catholics and 29% of the sample community
were also Catholic. The possibility of such a fact situation occurring is slight, however.
182. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) with
United States v. !BEW, Local 38,428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
18!1. See notes 5, 7, &: IO supra.
184. Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
185. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961); NLRB v. Darling&: Co.,
420 F.2d 6!1, 66 (7th Cir. 1970).
186. See, e.g., Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
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decisions that have grappled with the meaning of intent under title
VII. 187 This standard, however, is a fairly elastic one, and it could be
used effectively to enlarge the definition of discrimination well
beyond its narrow parameters. For example, the natural and probable consequence of a rule that requires employees to work Sundays
is to force those who have religious scruples against Sunday work
either to be fired or to give up their religious convictions. By ap.
plying the natural-and-foreseeable-consequences test, it could thus
be said that such a rule has its origins in an intent to discriminate
against one's religious beliefs. In such an instance, the requirement
that discrimination be intentional would be essentially meaningless,
because the meaning of intent would be all-inclusive.
It has been suggested in some title VII cases that this latter
definition of intent may be properly limited by the test of business
necessity-that is, a neutral policy that foreseeably results in disparate
treatment may nevertheless be valid if it is necessary for the safe and
efficient operations of the business.188 In the context of religious
discrimination under title VII, and more particularly in light of
Dewey, four observations can be made about the validity of such a
business necessity test.
First, as courts and arbitrators have recognized,189 the uniform
application of company rules or contractual provisions, such as
seniority, may well be necessary for the safe and efficient operation
of a business. Second, as with the expanded definition of discrimination noted earlier,190 the business necessity test has been developed
to justify practices that, while neutral on their face, perpetuate past
187. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir.
1970); Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 997 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); Dobbins v. !BEW, Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 448 (S.D. Ohio 1968). But
cf. Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
188. See, e.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The court defined the business necessity test as follows: "When an employer adopts a system that necessarily carries forward the incidents
of discrimination into the present, his practice constitutes on-going discrimination, unless the incidents are limited to those that safety and efficiency require." 416 F.2d at
994. Under this test the court held:
Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows: (I) Crown's job seniority
system carries forward the discriminatory effects integral to the company's former
employment practices. (2) The safe and efficient operation of the Bogalusa mill
does not depend upon maintenance of the job seniority system. (3) To the extent
that Crown's and the white union insisted upon carrying forward exclusion of a
racially-determined class, without business necessity, they committed, with the requisite intent, in the statutory sense, an unfair employment practice as defined
by Title VII.
416 F.2d at 997. This view was recently adopted by the Supreme Court in the racialdiscrimination context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 39 U.SL.W. 4317, 4319 (U.S. March
8, 1971).
189. See text accompanying notes 162-67 supra.
190. See pts. m. B. 8c III. E. supra.
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discrimination.191 It is not difficult to understand why courts view
with some skepticism practices that were premised in the first instance
on willful discrimination in the plainest sense; and, as a consequence,
why courts would require some stringent test of business necessity to
demonstrate that such practices are now free from racial taint. If it
could be demonstrated that a current company practice perpetuates
past acts of willful religious discrimination, then the business
necessity test would surely be appropriate in the religious- as well as
the racial-discrimination cases under title VII; but, in the absence of
such past discrimination, it surely is too stringent.
This conclusion is supported by a third observation about the
business necessity test. By its very nature, a collective bargaining
contract represents a long series of compromises. To be sure, there are
issues that result in complete victory for one side and complete
capitulation for the other; but on the whole, the process of collective
bargaining is one of give and take between company and union.
Moreover, on the union side at least, the demands put forth and
settlements made also represent compromises among political factions within the bargaining unit itself-between the young and the
old, the skilled and the unskilled, those who work nights and those
who work days. In such a setting, the test of business necessity might
be an impossible one to administer. Given this vital role of compromise, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has allowed unions
a "wide range of reasonableness," both at the negotiating table and
in the administration of a grievance procedure.192
For example, assume that some seniority system is necessary for
the safe and efficient operation of a business; but there are innumerable possible kinds of seniority systems-job, department, and plant,
to name but three. The particular seniority system in any one plant
may well be a reflection of the political ebb and flow within a union
over long periods of time, an indication of the ability of th~t particular union to impose its demands on the employer, or the result of
the priority given such a demand by the union. Suppose that one
particular system of seniority means that a Seventh Day Adventist or
an Orthodox Jew would have to work on Saturdays, while another
system would not require Saturday work. Since the first such seniority
system could not pass a business necessity test, would that mean that
it would have to be discarded for the second? To compound the
191. This problem is exhaustively analyzed in the opinion by Judge Wisdom in
Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1970).
192. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188-95 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
!1!10, !1!18 (195!1).
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problem, suppose that the first seniority system adversely affects
Seventh Day Adventists and Orthodox Jews, while the second (requiring Sunday but not Saturday work) affects employees like Dewey
who belong to the Faith Reformed Church. Must the company discard both seniority systems? Or should the legality of either seniority
system depend on a comparison of the number of Orthodox Jews
and Faith Reformed Church members working at the plant at the
time the system was adopted? Of course, examples such as these can
be cited ad infinitum, because the definition of discrimination is a
functional variant of the definition of religion and, as has been
shown,193 there is no meaningful definitional limit to the scope of
"religion." Thus, under the business necessity test, any seniority
system could be found to be discriminatory, depending only upon
the religious beliefs of the employee population at any given time.
Finally, in the context of religious discrimination, the business
necessity test appears to be a poorly veiled duplicate of the EEOC requirement of reasonable accommodation; this latter test, with its
grant of exculpation for "undue hardship," is surely not the law
under title VI!.194
Since the rejection of the business necessity test still leaves no
viable definition of intent, it may be useful to examine constitutionallaw considerations. In cases arising under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the rule has long been established that, as long as a statute is based on rational and legitimate
considerations, even though its impact is uneven, it is constitutional.195 The Supreme Court, in Dandridge v. Williams, 196 recently
gave renewed support to this reasonable-basis test in the area of
social and economic regulation. In that case, the Court reviewed a
Maryland statute that limited welfare aid to eligible families depending on the number of children in the family. Although the statute
had an uneven impact on larger families, the Court ruled that
it was constitutional because it had a rational basis:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made
193. See pt. II. supra.
194. See pt. III. D. supra.
195. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The rational-basis test must be distinguished from the com•
pelling-state-interest test that was followed by the Supreme Court in Sherbert. See text
accompanying notes 153-61 supra. As noted above (see text accompanying notes 155-56
supra), the compelling-state-interest test is the apparent forerunner of the EEOC
undue-hardship test, and therefore is subject to serious criticism in the context of the
enforcement of the religious-discrimination proscription under title VII.
196. 39'7 U.S. 4'11 (19'70).
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by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable
basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because it results
in some inequality:•101
It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination.198

Excluding the title VII cases involving acts of willful discrimination199 and those cases concerned with the present effects of prior acts
of willful discrimination200-in which a business necessity test may
be more appropriate-the constitutional test of "reasonableness" is a
salutary one for the purpose of defining intent under the statute.
Hence, a neutral rule that may have an unequal impact on certain
employees because of their religious beliefs should, if supported by
legitimate and reasonable considerations, overcome a charge of discrimination by intent.
Thus, in a Dewey-type case, if the employer can demonstrate that
the act complained of was taken pursuant to a neutral contract provision that has a rational basis, then there should be a presumption of
innocence and the burden of proof should be on the plaintiff to
overcome the presumption with more specific evidence of the proscribed intent. In the context of Dewey, since the employer's rule
requiring Sunday overtime and its evenhanded administration of this
requirement were both based on legitimate and rational considerations, it is easy to see how they pass muster under title VII. On the
other hand, rules that limit the weight a woman is allowed to
lift201 irrespective of a particular woman's ability, and rules that limit
a Negro's opportunity for work202 or advancement203 must surely fall.
V.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES UNDER TITLE

VII:

THE EMERGING

CONFLICT BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND ARBITRATION FORUMS IN
EMPLOYM:ENT DISCRIMINATION CASES

The interaction between public- and private-dispute settlement
devices is nothing new in the field of labor law. 204 In light of this past
197. 397 U.S. at 485, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911).
198. 397 U.S. at 487.
199. For example, an employer adopts a plant rule that explicitly excludes all
Catholics from certain high-pa}ing jobs within the plant.
200. For example, a· departmental seniority system is continued in operation in a
plant that formerly and for many years imposed racially segregated seniority lines, freezing black workers into the less desirable jobs in certain departments. This was the type
of situation in which the Supreme Court applied the business necessity test in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. March 8, 1971).
201. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
202. United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
203. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
204. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Spielberg Mfg.
Co., 112 NL.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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experience, the diversity of opinion in Dewey on the question of
election of remedies between title VII and arbitration is somewhat
surprising. However, the split between the court of appeals and the
district court in Dewey is in reality but a reflection of the conflicting
opinions among many courts that have recently grappled with this
issue.205
At the outset, it is important to emphasize what the disagreement
does not concern. It appears to be settled that there is no strict ab
initio election-of-remedies requirement forcing an employee to make
an irrevocable choice at the outset between pursuing his remedies
under a collective bargaining contract grievance and arbitration
procedure and pursuing his title VII remedies. The district court in
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company 206 is the only court to date that
has put a plaintiff to such an ab initio choice. Thus, the plaintiff
there was deemed to have waived his right to arbitration on the contract by electing to bring a title VII action in federal court. 207 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district
court on this issue, holding that
[i]t was error not to permit the plaintiffs to utilize dual or parallel
prosecution both in court and through arbitration so long as election
of remedy was made after adjudication so as to preclude duplicate
relief which would result in an unjust enrichment or windfall to the
plaintiffs.208

Even in those jurisdictions that take the position that a binding
election of remedies may occur after a grievance has been finally
adjudicated in arbitration or settled at an intermediate stage, the
courts do not require the charging party initially to make a binding
choice-as between arbitration or title VII-that will preclude a
subsequent decision to pursue the alternative course.200
The most compelling argument against the ab initio election
rule is that, in general, the employee makes no informed choice. It
is natural for an employee, especially a union member, to lodge
quickly a grievance when he feels he has become the victim of his
205. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Corey v. Avco Corp., 2
FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. 738 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1970). See also Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Newman v. Avco Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069
(M.D. Tenn. 1970); Washington v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal.
1968); Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
206. 272 F. Supp. 332, 339 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
207. 272 F. Supp. at 339-40.
208. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969).
209. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Newman v. Avco
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Washington v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 282
F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp, 291 F. Supp.
199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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employer's discrimination. The grievance procedure is usually
initiated and often carried through several steps without the grievant
having the advice of counsel. The aggrieved employee may not even
be aware that he could proceed by filing a charge with the EEOC or
state FEP commission; when he becomes aware of that alternative, it
would certainly be an unfair surprise for the employee to learn that
he has already lost the opportunity by promptly filing a grievance.
This unfairness is especially manifest if the grievance procedure contains strict and prompt time limitations, so that an employee will, as
a matter of course, seek first to preserve his rights under the agreement. Thus, many courts have, with sound justification, refused to
put the employee to an immediate choice of remedies. 210
The real conflict arises, however, over whether a court should
deem a plaintiff to have made an election of remedies precluding
maintenance of a title VII action when he has pursued his contractual
remedies to a final determination. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dewey, acting in accord with several lower federal and state
courts,211 has taken the position that once an employee has pursued
his claim to arbitration, he has made a final and binding election of
remedies. 212 On the other side, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in Hutchings v. United States Industries, Incorporated, 213
and the Seventh Circuit, in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,214
have held that an arbitration award or settlement at an intermediate
stage of the grievance procedure does not operate as a bar to a title
VII suit.
In general, the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits manifest these courts' distrust of the ability of a private process "essentially
tailored to the needs of the contracting parties" to vindicate the
public policies embodied in title VII. 215 These courts rely on the
premise that "determination under a contract grievance-arbitration
process will involve rights and remedies separate and distinct from
those involved in judicial proceedings under title VII." 216 Although
there is concurrent jurisdiction in the court and the arbitration process, it is directly analogous to the concurrent jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board);
210. See cases cited in note 209 supra.
211. Newman v. Avco Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 (M:.D. Tenn. 1970); Edwards v.
North American Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Washington v.
Aerojet Gen. Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Corey v. Avco Corp., 2 FAIR EMPL.
PRAc. CAS. 738 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1970).
212. 429 F.2d at 332.
213. 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
214. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
215. 428 F.2d at 311-12; 416 F.2d at 175.
216. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 1970).
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since the NLRB is not bound under a doctrine of election of remedies or res judicata to accept an arbitral determination affecting rights
and duties under the NLRA, 217 neither should the court accept an
arbitrator's decision on title VII rights as conclusive. On the contrary, the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals argue that
there are persuasive reasons why courts should treat the arbitrator's
decision as less than binding.218
As has been observed,219 the enforcement of title VII has not
been charged to an administrative agency that is comparable to the
NLRB, which has broad powers to enforce the NLRA. The EEOC
has no enforcement power; its power is limited to the investigation
and conciliation of unlawful employment practice charges of employees claiming discrimination. I£ the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the employee's charges are true, it attempts to alleviate the
discriminatory practice through the informal measures of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.22° Failing in this role, the EEOC grants
the aggrieved employee permission to sue, or, in appropriate cases,
the Attorney General initiates suit.221 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits
appear to be operating on the assumption that Congress failed to
grant enforcement powers to the EEOC and instead reposed them in
the courts because it felt that such an important and explosive area
of public policy was best implemented by the expertise of the federal
judiciary. Somehow these courts feel that to delegate to the arbitration process the power to make final and binding determinations of
title VII rights would be to derogate from their own responsibility.
Specifically, one hazard the courts see is that some arbitrators
limit themselves exclusively to contractual considerations and, as a
result, accord title VII and constitutional claims insufficient attention.222 Although it is far from a unanimous view, many arbitrators
see themselves as creatures of the contract, whose sole function is to
interpret and to apply the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement rather than to act as agents of government with the
authority and power to effect public policy.223 For these arbitrators,
the contract is the source and limit of their authority; to have
recourse to an external standard in order to restrict or to nullify contract terms would be to exceed the boundaries of that authority.
217. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
218. 428 F.2d at 313-14; 416 F.2d at 175.
219. See notes 122-27 supra and accompanying text.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
222. See, e.g., Pitman-Moore Div., 49 Lab. Arb. 709 (1967).
223. Compare United Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967) with Simoniz Co., 70-1
CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 1J 8024 (1969).
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If there is an irreconcilable conflict between title VII and the
terms of an agreement, the possible treatment outlined above justly
warrants the fears of the courts. Professor Bernard Meltzer believes
that, in the case of such conflict, it is the arbitrator's duty to abide by
the contract and ignore the law.224 His view, of course, serves to
highlight the problem inherent in the strict enforcement of the
election-of-remedies rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey.
Implementation of the Meltzer view by the many arbitrators who
share it,225 coupled with a binding election-of-remedies rule, would
indeed pose a serious threat to title VII rights.
224. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI.
L. REv. 545, 557 (1967). For an excellent discussion summarizing the divergent views of
arbitrators on this subject, see Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law,
in THE ExPANDING RoLE OF NEUTRALS 29 (A. Somers ed. 1970).
225. In arbitration cases that involve alleged acts of employment discrimination
that are cognizable under both a contract grievance procedure and under title VII,
arbitrators hold widely divergent views concerning the extent to which public-policy
considerations should affect the outcome of the contract grievance dispute. In the
"typical" employment discrimination case, the arbitrator handles the issue of discriminaton in the context of the collective agreement and makes no reference to related state or federal laws. See, e.g., Lockheed Georgia Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 769 (1970);
Eastex, Inc., 70-2 CCH LAB. .ARB. AWARDS ,i 8636 (1970); Dewey-Portland Cement Co.,
43 Lab. Arb. 165 (1964). A preponderance of the cases in which the application of title
VII or some state law is raised by one side or the other seems to support the rule that
an arbitrator has no business interpreting or applying a public statute in a contract
grievance dispute. See, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 600 {1970); United
Airlines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 727 (1967); Pitman-Moore Div., 49 Lab. Arb. 709 (1967);
Eaton Mfg. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 1045 (1966); Stanley Works, 39 Lab. Arb. 374 (1962);
Bethlehem Steel Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 699 (1955); Douglas &: Lomason Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 812
(1954); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 606 (1954); Morton Salt Co., 21 Lab.
Arb. 797 (1953); International Harvester Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 29 (1951). The most common
exception to this majority view is the rule that the arbitrator should not order the
company or union to do something that is clearly unlawful. For example, if a state
law prohibits female employees from working in jobs that require the lifting of more
than twenty-five pounds, the arbitrator will not order the company to promote a
female candidate to the job in dispute, even if she is the senior qualified employee.
Canton Provision Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 942 (1969). Under this view, the contract is said to
be modified by the applicable statute. See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 54 Lab. Arb.
320 (1969); Capital Mfg. Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 669 (1968); Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 49
Lab. Arb. 1186 (1967); Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884 (1966); Schaefer Supermarkets,
Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. ll5 (1966). Another common exception to the majority view is found
when the parties have, by submission, conferred jurisdiction upon the arbitrator to
decide the contract issue in the light of applicable federal or state law. See, e.g., Super
Valu Stores, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. II2 (1968); Morton Salt Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 797 (1953).
Some arbitrators have extended the majority view by holding that if the parties have
intentionally adopted a contract clause pursuant to an existing statute, with the object
of incorporating the body of public law into the contract, then the arbitrator may
properly refer to the applicable statute and any regulations or decisions thereunder in
attempting to ascertain the meaning of the contract clause in issue. See, e.g., Dayton
Tire &: Rubber Co., 55 Lab. Arb. 357 (1970); Weyerhauser Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 857 (1970);
Manchester Gas Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 329 (1969); Weirton Steel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 795 (1968).
The new and, thus far, minority view in employment discrimination cases holds
that collective bargaining agreements include by reference all public law applicable
thereto; hence, the arbitrator should apply constitutional, statutory, and common law
to aid in the resolution of any grievance dispute. See, e.g., Avco Corp., 54 Lab. Arb.
165 (1970); Simoniz Co., 70-1 CCH LAB • .ARB. AWARDS 11 8024 (1969); Weirton Steel Co.,
50 Lab. Arb. 795 (1968); Hough Mfg. Corp., 51 Lab. Arb. 785 (1968). Under this new
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Even when harmonizing the law and contractual intent is
possible, not all arbitrators feel it incumbent on themselves to do so.
The viewpoint of these arbitrators, however, conceives arbitration as
too narrow a process. Arbitration agreements do not exist in a
vacuum, but subsist in a world in which the law plays a significant
part. Parties bargain against a background of rules and understand
that these rules shall temper and color their contract. Therefore,
sensible and responsible interpretation of the contract may at times
require consideration of the surrounding body of law. 226 The Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corporation,227 acknowledged the propriety of the arbitrator's drawing on surrounding law "for guidance," although an award based
solely upon enacted legislation would exceed his jurisdiction. In
Hutchings, the Seventh Circuit said, "We do not mean to imply that
employer obligations having their origin in Title VII are not to be
incorporated into the arbitral process. When possible they should
be."228 Nevertheless, what ought to be is not always coextensive with
what is, and, when some arbitrators are not taking real cognizance of
the law, the courts are understandably reluctant to hold that all
arbitral awards apparently covering a title VII issue preclude the
grievant's title VII remedies.
Even if an arbitrator does look to title VII in the course of
ascertaining the contractual intent, there is a legitimate fear that he
will lack the expertise to deal adequately with the statutory requirements. For example, in Bowe, the plaintiff claimed that the employer
was guilty of sex discrimination in restricting female employees to
jobs that did not require lifting more than thirty-five pounds. A
state law imposed a thirty-five-pound weight-lifting restriction on
women. It cannot reasonably be expected that all arbitrators will
possess the expertise to decide whether the employer's reliance on a
state statute comports with the demands of title VII. 229 Indeed, the
district court succumbed to the argument, which the Seventh Circuit
view, some arbitrators have even gone so far as to rule on the issue of federal preemption when federal and state statutes were seemingly in conflict. The most frequently recurring pre-emption problem has involved the clash between state laws that
impose certain restrictions on the use of female labor and title VII, which proscribes
"sex discrimination." See, e.g., Avco Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 165 (1970); Simoniz Co., 70-1
CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 1[ 8024 (1969) (federal law supersedes state laws); General Fireproofing Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 819 (1967) (title VII does not pre-empt state statutes).
226. Stanley Works, 39 Lab. Arb. 374, 378 (1962).
227. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
228. 428 F.2d at 313.
229. Compare Super Valu Stores, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 112 (1968) with Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Grabiec, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 945 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1970) and Jones Metal
Prods. Co. v. Walker, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1113 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Nov. 19, 1970).
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held to be erroneous,230 that state laws setting weight-lifting restrictions on women were not affected by title VII. 231 If the district court
misconceived the requirements of title VII's antidiscrimination provisions, confidence can hardly be unhesitatingly reposed in the
ability of arbitrators-many of whom are not lawyers-correctly to
interpret the broad general language of title VII, which is susceptible
to varied interpretations, or to make their way through the intricacies
of the EEOC guidelines.
In addition to the above arguments, there are some further
practical considerations that militate against the election-of-remedies
doctrine that was followed by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey. As suggested earlier,232 the collective bargaining process is a uniquely
tripartite arrangement, involving the rights and responsibilities of
the individual employee, the union, and the employer. The rights
of the individual, vis-a-vis the rights of the majority of the employees
represented by the union, may of necessity be compromised-especially with respect to the processing of grievances under a collective
agreement, in which case the Supreme Court has consistently granted
a "wide range of reasonableness" to unions in handling individual
employee complaints. 233 A union has discretion, within the bounds
of "fair representation" and "good faith," to drop, settle, or appeal
to arbitration an individual's grievance, even though the rights of
the individual may be sacrificed for the good of the majority. 234 In
Vaca v. Sipes, 235 the Supreme Court emphasized that a union could
properly settle a grievance short of arbitration, notwithstanding the
fact that a court, upon hearing the merits of the claim, might sustain
the individual's complaint:
For if a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient
merit to justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of
fair representation because a judge or jury later found the grievance
meritorious, the union's incentive to settle such grievances short of
arbitration would be seriously reduced. The dampening effect on the
entire grievance procedure of this reduction of the union's freedom
to settle claims in good faith would surely be substantial.236

Since the union may lawfully decide to drop a grievance short
230. 416 F.2d at 716.
231. 272 F. Supp. at 364.
232. See text accompanying notes 158-61 supra.
233. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
234. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists
Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
235. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
236. 386 U.S. at 192-93.
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of arbitration for reasons that may be wholly irrelevant to the merits
of the claim being advanced by the individual,237 it certainly would
not be reasonable to foreclose the title VII remedy to an aggrieved
employee whose grievance has been settled to his detriment. The
basic fallacy in the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey, in
adopting the election-of-remedies rule, is the assumption that the
individual, rather than the union, determines the ultimate course
of the grievance complaint. The collective bargaining process is
premised on majority rule, whereas title VII sets forth certain
statutory protections for the individual who is a member of a proscribed minority. Given this difference, a union's decision with respect to the processing of a contract claim should not be determinative of statutory rights.
In this same vein, other problems may be postulated. Suppose,
for example, that the aggrieved individual initially urges the union
to process his charge of discrimination under the contract against
the company; but subsequently, after the grievance has been filed
but before it has been appealed to arbitration, the employee decides
that he would prefer to pursue his title VII remedy. If the union
thereafter determines to appeal the case to arbitration under a contract clause that gives the union the sole authority to appeal,238 is the
employee to be precluded from advancing his claim under title VII?
Further, suppose that the employee is unwilling to cooperate with
the union in its presentation of the arbitration case; or suppose that
the union, by the manner in which it presents the evidence, "suggests" to the arbitrator that it considers the case to be a weak one.239
Should the employee, under these circumstances, subsequently be
foreclosed from filing suit under title VII?
It would certainly seem that the above considerations weigh
heavily against any rule that would prohibit an employee from
bringing suit under title VII merely because the allegation of discrimination has been raised under a contract grievance procedure.
237. See generally Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 1435 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 631 (1959); Cox,
Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. R.Ev. 601 (1956); Hanslowe, The Collec•
tive Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963); Lewis,
Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SuP. CT. R.Ev.
81; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L.
R.Ev. 362 (1962); Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective
Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963).
238. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1962).
239. See generally R. FLEMING, THE LABOR AluiITRATION PROCESS 107-33 (1965);
Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, l!l
STAN. L. R.Ev. 235 (1961); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and
Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 361, 403 (1962).
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In fact, the question should not be posed under the heading of
"election of remedies"; rather, the issue really concerns the extent
to which a court in a title VII suit should give deference to an
arbitrator's award under a collective bargaining contract.240
While a strict election-of-remedies rule is wholly undesirable,
neither would it serve any useful purpose for the courts freely to·
permit an employee in a title VII suit to relitigate an issue after
it has been decided against him by an arbitrator. To condone
relitigation in all cases could easily threaten to undermine the efficacy of the arbitration process. The vitality of arbitration depends,
in no small measure, upon its final and binding quality. This vitality
would be adversely affected if, for example, an employee were permitted to relitigate a charge of discrimination under title VII after
he had voluntarily pursued his contract remedy, after he was given
rigorous and fair representation by the union, and after the contract
antidiscrimination proscription was found to parallel that of title
VII.2u
Distilled to its essentials, the position of the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits is that, although the national labor policy favoring resolution of industrial disputes by arbitration may argue in favor of an
election-of-remedies doctrine, the strong public policy against discrimination according to race, sex, or religion will not permit it. As
has been shown, this judgment has considerable appeal in certain
cases. When the arbitrator pays no heed to title VII considerations, or
when for some reason his award does blatant violence to the purposes
and policies of the Act, holding the plaintiff to an election of remedies may well be undesirable. On the other hand, uniformly permitting employees to have access to the courts after arbitration when the
issue arbitrated is identical to the one the court must decide in a title
VII suit is subversive of the arbitration process, extraordinarily
burdensome on the defendant, and conducive to wastefully repetitious litigation.
If the conflict is viewed abstractly as a clash between the policy
favoring the private settlement of industrial disputes by arbitration
and the policy condemning racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic discrimination, there can be no doubt that the latter supersedes the
former. But that viewpoint is outrageously simplistic. First, the importance of arbitration in the national labor policy is too fundamental for the arbitral process to be so summarily undermined.
Moreover, the resolution of discrimination claims by private and
240. See generally Comment, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J.
1191-96 (1968).
241. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1970).
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even informal measures is directly in accord with the congressional
intent in enacting title VII. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Hutchings:
Title VII outlaws certain forms of discrimination of employment.
An important method for the fulfillment of congressional purpose is
the utilization of private grievance-arbitration procedures. This
comports not only with the national labor policy favoring arbitration as the means for the final adjustment of labor disputes, e.g.,
The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 397 U.S.
235 (1970) ... but also with the specific enforcement policy of Title
VII that discrimination is better curtailed through voluntary compliance with the Act than through court orders.242

Finally and most significantly, simply because there is concurrent
jurisdiction between the arbitral and statutory processes does not
mean there is general disharmony between national policies. As has
been stated, there is more often concordance than clash.243
Consequently, showing some deference to arbitration seems no less
appropriate as a solution here than it is when the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator and the NLRB overlap. In such circumstances, the Board
has adopted a policy of deferring to arbitration under the so-called
Spielberg doctrine. 244 Under that rule, the Board refuses to exercise
its pre-emptory jurisdiction to set aside arbitration awards dealing
with unfair labor practice charges, provided the arbitration proceedings "have been fair and regular, all parties [have] agreed to be
bound, and the decision of the [arbitrator] is not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act."245 A doctrine analogous to that
formulated in Spielberg might constitute the best solution to the
problems presented by the concurrent jurisdiction of the grievance
procedure and the courts in title VII cases.
The possibility of such a solution was acknowledged in Hutchings, in which the court said, "we leave for the future the question
whether a procedure similar to that applied by the Labor Board in
deferring to arbitration awards when certain standards are met
might properly be adopted in Title VII cases."246 That the time is
ripe for consideration of such a procedure is indicated by the court's
remark that it was only because of the "state of the record" that it
passed over the question.247
While the Spielberg approach seems well suited for adoption in
242. 428 F.2d at 313.
243. See note 204 supra and accompanying text.
244. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See also Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 175 NL.R.B. 23 (1969).
245. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
246. 428 F.2d at 314 n.10.
247. 428 F.2d at 314 n.10.
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title VII cases, there may be additional safeguards that should be
added to the rule in order to make it truly functional. Spielberg
arose under the NLRA, which is premised on the notion of majority rule and exclusive representation by the designated bargaining
agent,248 whereas title VII is concerned primarily with protecting
the rights of individuals who are in certain specified minority categories. Therefore, to ensure the full statutory protections intended,
the courts in title VII suits should only give deference to an arbitrator's award when the following conditions have been satisfied:
(1) the arbitration hearing has been fair and regular;
(2) the union, employer, and employee would otherwise be
bound by the decision of the arbitrator under the applicable
collective bargaining contract;
(3) the employee has voluntarily participated in the arbitration proceeding-that is, the employee has not resisted the
union's efforts in his behalf;
(4) the employee has been apprised by the union that a
decision by the arbitrator adverse to his claim may subsequently
foreclose relief under title VII;
(5) the employee has been fairly and adequately represented;
(6) the arbitrator has found that the contract proscribes
discrimination as defined by title VII;
(7) the arbitrator has considered and fully decided the charge
of discrimination under the applicable antidiscrimination contract clause;
(8) the employee has been given the option of using his own
counsel to present his case to the arbitrator; and
(9) the arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of title VII.249
On the other hand, there should be no deference given to a contractual arbitration procedure if:

(1) the alleged charge of discrimination has not been appealed to arbitration; or
(2) the grievance has been settled without the employee's
consent; or
(3) the arbitrator holds against the employee but either (i)
248. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
249. Thus, for example, if the courts have recognized the present effects of past
willful acts as constituting "discrimination by intent" under title VII (see, e.g., Local
189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
919 (1970); United States v. !BEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970)), then an
arbitrator's contrary rule should not be respected.

652

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:599

does so for reasons other than the alleged discrimination or (ii)
gives no reason or justification for his award; 250 or
(4) the employer is unable to show that the employee's claim
of discrimination has been fully and fairly litigated in the arbitration hearing.

I£ these standards were given uniform recognition by the courts
under a "deferral rule," they would adequately serve to protect the
aggrieved individual under title VII and, at the same time, to protect the sanctity and binding quality of the collective bargaining
arbitration process.
Given this type of a deferral doctrine, the question arises who
will formulate and administer it. In theory, nothing should prevent
the courts from doing so; but, as a practical matter, the threshold
investigation required could too easily tum into a full-blown trial
on the merits-precisely what is sought to be avoided. Moreover,
unless the Supreme Court lays down the criteria under which a
plaintiff's suit will be barred out of deference to arbitration, there is
likely to be undesirable variance among the circuits.
The logical body to formulate a deferral rule is obviously the
EEOC. Yet, under the present statutory scheme of title VII, such
action by ili:_e EEOC would be unlikely. Section 706(e) of the Act
provides that the Commission "shall" send the aggrieved party a
letter permitting him to bring suit within thirty days if "the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this
title."251 One might argue that the Commission could, under the
standards proposed above, consider an arbitration award to be a
voluntary compliance and thus selectively limit the party's ability to
sue by not issuing a suit letter in appropriate cases. However, the
Commission views its statutory powers as inadequate to prevent a
party from bringing an action if the party himself rejects the settlement.252 Moreover, it has been held that the scheme of title VII does
not prevent a private party from bringing suit if the party does not
agree with the settlement agreed upon by the EEOC and the employer}~53 This result comports with the failure of Congress to grant
enforcement power to the EEOC and with the legislative history of
the Act, which indicates that it was not the intention of Congress to
250. "Arbitrators have no obligation to the Court to give their reasons for an
award" (Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ), and
therefore the employee should not be precluded from "relitigation" on his statutory
claim if the arbitrator does not make it clear that the title Vll issue has been resolved.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
252. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
253. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text.
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place the Commission in the courthouse door. 254 Consequently, as
matters now stand, the Commission would be unable to bar an
aggrieved employee from bringing an action in federal court by
ruling that an arbitration award is conclusive of his rights. The Commission has indicated a willingness to defer consideration of charges
lodged with it, pending arbitration up to the statutory time limits; 255
but, obviously, this type of delay would be of no consequence if the
arbitration award were issued within the time limits but was unsatisfactory to the charging party. On the other hand, if the EEOC were
granted cease-and-desist powers, it would then be the logical agency
to create deferral rules.
State FEP commissions that have enforcement powers are perhaps
in a better position than the EEOC to defer selectively to arbitration
awards, but section 706(b) of the Civil Rights Act requires in most
cases that the EEOC defer action on the charge to the state or local
agencies for only sixty days.256 Hence, despite the existence of an arbitration award that the state FEP commission could treat as conclusive, such a state procedure would in no way foreclose the possibility
of a title VII suit.
Therefore, until the Supreme Court renders a decision in this
area, the whole question of election of remedies and the effect of title
VII on the arbitration process will be unresolved.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The prohibitions against discrimination in employment, and
specifically the ban on religious discrimination, embodied in title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 comprise a noble venture. The temptation in implementing that venture, of course, is to paint with
broad strokes. But the delicate relationship between the religious
and the secular calls for a precision of analysis in the title VII field
which, if the legal ·wranglings in Dewey are any example, has been
seriously wanting to date.
To say that the definition of discrimination is one of effect is
surely to prove too much, and the notion of accommodation is no
less troublesome. Such formulas may turn a few to religious conversion; however, they will also undoubtedly have disruptive effects on
the uniform administration of collective bargaining contracts. Even
assuming these problems to be less grave than here portrayed, still it
254. See note 127 supra.
255. Opinion Letter of EEOC General Counsel, Oct. 20, 1966, in BNA LAB. PoLICY
&: PRAC. 401:3028 (1966).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964). This section also provides that the sixty-day
period shall be extended to 120 days during the first year after the effective date of the
state or local FEP law.
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is difficult to fathom the apparent subjugation of the secular to the
religious by the rule of accommodation formulated by the EEOC2117
in conjunction with religious-discrimination cases under title VII.
The EEOC rule is a curious departure from the traditional view that
"we must accommodate our idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in communal life .•.." 2118
Equally disturbing is the enunciation of the election-of-remedies
doctrine by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey 259 in its aborted attempt to
glean the proper perspective for the arbitration process in the handling of title VII claims. While some deferral rule may indeed be
warranted under certain circumstances260 in order to strike a workable balance between the role of the arbitrators and the courts in the
adjudication of title VII claims, surely Dewey-in which the issue of
the alleged title VII claim was never really litigated in arbitration261
-was not the proper setting for resort to this principle of law. Furthermore, there is the more troublesome question, which was ignored
by the Sixth Circuit, whether arbitrators should be entrusted with
the final and binding adjudication of alleged title VII claims, especially when no legal safeguards presently exist to protect individual
claimants who may be adversely affected by the invocation of the
election-of-remedies doctrine.
VII.

POSTSCRIPT

On January 18, 1971, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company.262 The two questions presented
to the Court for final determination are: (I) Does an employer engage in religious discrimination in violation of section 703(a)(l) of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act if he refuses to make reasonable accommodations to an employee's religious observance of a weekly day of rest?
(2) Is an employee who has sought arbitration of his claim for wrongful discharge under a labor agreement barred from bringing a Civil
Rights Act suit arising out of the same discharge?263
257 See note 44 supra.
258. Otten v. :Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Stimpel v.
California State Personnel :Bd., 6 Cal. App. 3d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr. 797, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 952 (1970).
259. 429 F.2d at 331-32.
260. See notes 246-50 supra and accompanying text.
261. 291 F. Supp. at 789.
262. 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1971) (No. 835).
263. 39 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 835).

